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Abstract
The political economy of life and death in the U.S.A.
Elias Nosrati
This research charts the structural transformations of American capitalism
and attendant shifts in the distribution of health and illness at the dawn of
the 21st century. Through the analytic lens of the political economy of public
health, I shed novel light on the upstream determinants of America’s overdose
epidemic, which is claiming tens of thousands of lives every single year, and
on deepening social inequalities in life expectancy, all-cause mortality, and
premature mortality risk. Economic decline, notably in the form of deindus-
trialisation, has fractured working class communities and spawned a highly
stratified social structure. In response to this development, American social
policy has undergone a distinctive transformation involving a historically un-
precedented expansion of the penal system. This has resulted in the rapid
swelling of the correctional population, reaching almost 7 million people in
2012, of whom over 2.2 million find themselves behind bars. Despite the
salience and magnitude of these phenomena, virtually no existing research
has investigated the connections between deindustrialisation, incarceration,
ii
and America’s public health crisis. This thesis fills this gap by using new
data from U.S. states and counties between 1980 and 2014 to examine the
social, economic, and political roots of increasing health inequality.
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In 2017, over 72,000 individuals, largely from the bottom of the class struc-
ture, died from drug overdoses in the United States (National Institute on
Drug Abuse, 2018), joining the ranks of over half a million people who have
suffered the same fate since 1980 (Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2018). Since the
turn of the previous century, the richest Americans have experienced gains
in longevity equivalent to the curing of cancer, whilst the health of the poor
has either stagnated or declined (Olshansky et al., 2012; Chetty et al., 2016).
These striking facts form the starting point of this doctoral thesis, which
seeks to offer a novel social scientific account of their root causes. The pur-
pose of this introduction is to situate my research agenda in an emerging
body of literature that tries to grapple with the reality of the American pop-
ulation health landscape. In what follows, I summarise the state of current
knowledge, identify important gaps, and outline the analytic steps through
which I seek to make a contribution to this field of enquiry.
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Explaining America’s public health crisis
In a recent pair of studies, subject to extensive media coverage and pub-
lic debate, Anne Case and Angus Deaton examine mortality trends in the
United States since the tail end of the previous century (Case and Deaton,
2015; 2017). Their analyses yield four principal findings. First, they note
a dramatic rise in mortality rates from so-called “external” causes such as
drug-related poisonings, intentional self-harm, accidents, and alcohol-induced
liver cirrhosis. This rise has been particularly salient amongst non-Hispanic
Whites aged between 45 and 54, who have experienced an average annual in-
crease of 5.4% in such deaths between 1999 and 2015. Second, they highlight
how so-called “deaths of despair” constitute an increasingly central compo-
nent of all-cause mortality, resulting in a sudden reversal of overall mortality
trends for non-Hispanic Whites in midlife. They estimate that this reversal
has caused 488,500 excess deaths between 1999 and 2013, and 54,000 excess
deaths in 2013 alone. This lethal pattern has continued its upward-spiralling
trajectory after 2013 and is further associated with stagnating survival rates
from heart disease and cancer. Third, whilst these patterns exist for the
population as a whole, the educational health gradient has increased sharply
in a short time period. For instance, amongst non-Hispanic Whites, the ratio
of mortality rates of those with no more than a high school diploma to those
with a university degree has shifted from 2.6 in 1999 to 4.1 in 2013 for all
causes, from 2.4 to 4.0 for all external causes, and from 4.0 to 7.2 for drug-
related poisonings alone. Those at the bottom of the educational hierarchy
have experienced an increase of 134 additional all-cause deaths per 100,000
population since 1999, of which 68.7 have been due to external causes, of
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which, in turn, 44.3 have been overdose deaths. Finally, Case and Deaton
show that increases in midlife mortality are accompanied by rising morbid-
ity, notably when it comes to self-reported experiences of chronic pain and
psychological distress.
These findings offer a series of scientific puzzles: what are the root causes
of rising “deaths of despair”? What are the driving forces behind increas-
ing health inequality between the top and bottom of the socioeconomic or-
der? And why have these patterns, especially when it comes to overdose
deaths, materialised at such a large scale in the United States but not in
other wealthy countries? The purpose of the present research is to address
these points through empirical analysis and theoretical articulation as seen
through an analytic lens located at the interface of sociology, political econ-
omy, and public health. Whilst the studies described above constitute an
important starting point, I will seek to deploy them as an empirical spring-
board to probe the deeper determinants of inequalities in disability, disease,
and death in 21st century America. Case and Deaton (2017) do offer a
preliminary explanatory framework in which income stagnation, downward
intergenerational mobility, and fractured social and family relations form the
key ingredients of what they dub “cumulative disadvantage”. In particular,
they highlight long-run patterns of deteriorating employment parameters,
notably declining labour force participation rates amongst individuals with
low levels of formal education, as well as unstable social bonds resulting from
economic hardship, especially in the form of dwindling marriage rates and
disintegrating family units.
In what follows, I draw on the insights of Case and Deaton but offer
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an alternative aetiological account of America’s ongoing public health cri-
sis. In particular, my divergence rests on three simple observations. First,
whereas Case and Deaton focus exclusively on a specific subset of the Amer-
ican population as defined by ethnicity and age (i.e. non-Hispanic Whites
between the ages of 45 and 55) within a timespan of about 15 years, emerg-
ing evidence suggests a broader pattern of declining health at the bottom of
the class structure that is neither confined to this specific demographic nor
to the given time period. In fact, nation-wide age-standardised mortality
rates from drug use disorders (to pick the most dramatic example) increased
by 618.3% between 1980 and 2014 as a whole – amounting to no less than
542,501 deaths – but by 238.2% before the new millennium and by 112.4%
from 2000 to 2014 (Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2018). Growth in the latter period
has been linked to increased opioid abuse since the late 1990s. In Decem-
ber 1995, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the deregulation
of OxyContin,1 a medication used for the relief of moderate to severe pain.
Research has shown that unequal clinical prescription patterns by patient
ethnicity have disproportionately “favoured” non-Hispanic Whites (Pletcher
et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2009; Singhal et al., 2016; Netherland and
Hansen, 2017). However, concurrent increases in drug-related mortality for
African Americans have been driven by heroin on the one hand – currently
rising at an annual rate of 34% – and synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl
and its analogues – rising at an annual rate of 107% – on the other (Alexan-
der et al., 2018). A recent report by the Chicago Urban League revealed
1 Produced by Purdue Pharmaceutical, whose sales revenues from OxyContin alone
amounted to $35 billion by 2017 (Keefe, 2017).
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that the rate of opioid overdose deaths amongst African Americans is higher
than that of the general population in several states, including District of
Columbia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In
Illinois, deaths from pain pills increased nearly nine-fold amongst African
Americans and tripled amongst Whites. In the city of Chicago – one that
has experienced wrenching deindustrialisation and economic decline at the
bottom of the sociospatial structure – nearly half (48.4%) of all opioid deaths
occur amongst African Americans, despite the fact that Blacks make up only
32% of the total population. The majority of these deaths take place in
Chicago’s stigmatised neighbourhoods of concentrated poverty of the former
industrial Black Belt, including Austin, East and West Garfield Park, En-
glewood, Fuller Park, Humboldt Park, and North Lawndale (Bechteler and
Kane-Willis, 2017). As such, the exclusive focus on the existential crisis of
America’s middle-aged Whites seems to shift attention away from a more
deep-seated tendency of class-driven “despair” that cuts across ethno-racial
lines of demarcation (see also Woolf et al., 2018).
Second, mounting overdose deaths remain subject to substantial spatial
variation, as visualised in Figure 1, which maps the distribution of age-
standardised mortality rates from drug use disorders at the U.S. county level
(Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2018). The reader will note how both levels and
changes in such deaths follow a distinct geographical pattern, notably in the
form of prominent clusters in Kentucky and West Virginia, in New Mexico,
but also in the former slave states of the South. However, such variation
is either suppressed or reconfigured when bundling together various causes
of death under the single rubric of “despair” (see Case and Deaton, 2017:
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409–410). As more recent data released by the Institute for Health Metrics
and Evaluation reveal, the geography of the overdose epidemic differs sig-
nificantly from that of alcohol- or suicide-related deaths (Dwyer-Lindgren et
al., 2018). The source of this spatial expression is far from evident in the
extant literature2 and rigorous empirical studies of geographical heterogene-
ity remain scarce. Whilst economic disadvantage is likely to play a major
role at the aggregate level, there is little evidence of why such disadvantage
proves lethal in some places but not others. This puzzle is reinforced in a
recent study by Raj Chetty and colleagues (2016), who examined the rela-
tionship between income and life expectancy at age 40 in the United States
between 2001 and 2014. They demonstrate that the life expectancy gap be-
tween the top and the bottom of the income spectrum has increased rapidly
at the dawn of the century, to the point where indigent lives are cut short
by up to a decade and a half compared to those of the wealthy. However,
whereas the rich tend to live longer everywhere, life expectancy amongst the
poor differs markedly from one place to another, as seen in Figure 2. To
the areas of poor health highlighted in the previous maps, this one adds the
Midwestern Rust Belt, where rapid industrial decline has left an indelible
social imprint. In other words, for those tethered to the bottom rungs of
the socioeconomic order, geography matters. When viewed in tandem with
Figures 3 and 4, which visualise the distribution of levels and changes in life
expectancy across counties based on novel data from the Institute for Health
2 It is worth highlighting that, contrary to many media portrayals, this spatial ex-
pression does not correspond to a divide between urban and rural areas. This is also
emphasised by Case and Deaton in their latest Brookings paper.
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Metrics and Evaluation, Chetty et al.’s analyses offer strong evidence of a cor-
respondence between social and physical space. This correspondence merits
scientific probing – with a focus on the specific components of disadvantage
that may prove deadly, and how they relate to one another.
Finally, although the widespread emphasis on economic decline and in-
security offers a largely convincing causal narrative surrounding the ongoing
opioid epidemic, it fails to explain why resource shocks have proven so fatal
on one side of the Atlantic but not on the other. As evidenced by Figures 5
and 6, the skyrocketing of preventable mortality in America is unparalleled
elsewhere in the world – although fiscal austerity in post-recession Europe
has done more than expected to offer a sense of balance (Stuckler and Basu,
2013; Kentikelenis et al., 2014; Reeves et al., 2015; Hiam et al., 2017). What
is different about the United States? Towards the end of their Brookings pa-
per, Case and Deaton outline a simple model of general health as a function
of some latent variable.3 Their provisional application of this model to their
data on mortality trends over time leads them to conclude that at the root
of America’s public health crisis, “there may be two underlying factors, not
one, but they are not very different” (Case and Deaton, 2017: 438; emphasis
added). What second factor other than economic decline could account for
the phenomena described above?
One of the largest and most astounding changes taking place in the United
States over the past four odd decades has been the growth of the penal state
3 Their model takes the form yab = α + f(a) + θX
b, where y is the health outcome
variable; a and b index age and birth year, respectively; f is some unknown functional form;
α, X, and θ designate an intercept term, some unobservable initial condition exposure,
and its corresponding systematic component parameter, respectively.
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Figure 1: Spatial variation in age-standardised mortality rates from drug use disorders at
the U.S. county level. Source: Dwyer-Lindgren et al. (2018).
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Figure 2: Spatial variation in male (top figure) and female (bottom figure) life expectancy
at age 40 in the bottom income quartile at the U.S. commuting zone level. Source: Chetty
et al. (2016).
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Figure 3: Spatial variation in life expectancy at birth at the U.S. county level. Source:
Dwyer-Lindgren et al. (2017).
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Figure 4: Spatial variation in changes in life expectancy at birth at the U.S. county level
between 1980 and 2014. Source: Dwyer-Lindgren et al. (2017).
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(National Research Council, 2014). After 50 years of relative stability, the
national jail and prison incarceration rate stood at 161 residents per 100,000
population in 1973. In 2007, the corresponding figure was 767. In absolute
numbers rather than rates, this amounts to a shift from just under 400,000
to over 2.2 million individuals behind bars – a sevenfold increase in less than
four decades. After a slump in the 1960s, state level growth in prison in-
carceration rates exceeded 60% in the 1970s, 100% in the 1980s, 55% in the
1990s, and around 10% in the 2000s. This development alone is not only
historically unprecedented but has also left the United States in a unique
position on an international scale, as illustrated in Figure 7, which compares
prison incarceration rates amongst selected countries.4 However, as visu-
alised in Figure 8, the incarcerated population accounts for only a quarter of
those under criminal justice supervision when individuals subject to proba-
tion and parole are included (Wacquant, 2009: 63). In the last four decades,
the probation population has grown fourfold from around 920,000 to over
4 million, whilst the population under parole has grown by a factor of six
from 143,000 to 851,000 in 2012. Thus, the overall correctional population
has experienced rapid swelling since 1972, counting just under 7 million in-
dividuals in 2012 (National Research Council, 2014: 40–42). Approximately
3% of the total adult population and 15% of adult African American males
have ever been imprisoned, and around 8% of all adults and a full one-third
of African Americans have felony records, amounting to almost 19 million
4 A simple comparison of Figures 5 and 7 offers a first clue of a central argument in this
thesis. The reader will note how the distribution of drug-related mortality seems closely
linked to the size of the penal state.
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people nationwide (Shannon et al., 2017).
What these numbers conceal is the twofold selectivity whereby the pe-
nal state operates across both social and physical space. Amongst those
condemned to serve time in American prisons, unemployment rates lie just
below 40%, whilst 15% work part-time or occasionally; around 13% possess
any post-secondary education or vocational training, whilst half the popu-
lation failed to graduate from high school; two-thirds belong to households
living on less than half the official poverty line for a family of three, yet less
than 25% received any form of public assistance; up to 60% were raised by
a single parent, whilst 14% lived in an orphanage or group home as a child
(Wacquant, 2009: 70–71). The class disproportionality of exposure to penal
confinement is evidenced by how America’s punitive upsurge has more or
less exclusively been concentrated amongst those without any form of higher
education. In fact, whilst ethno-racial disparities in imprisonment have been
at the forefront of both media and scholarly attention (see e.g. Alexander,
2010; Pettit, 2012), changes in incarceration over time suggest even more
pronounced class differentials (see National Research Council, 2014: 65–67;
see Pettit and Western, 2004; Western, 2006; Wacquant, 2010; Chetty et al.,
2018: Figure VII; for a discussion of “racial fluidity” across the class struc-
ture, see Saperstein and Penner, 2012). Between 1972 and 2010, the ratio of
incarcerated men aged 20–39 with no more than 12 years of completed educa-
tion to those with at least some college attendance jumped from around 2.0
to over 8.0 amongst both Blacks and Whites.5 On the other hand, the Black-
5 The social structure of the incarceration gap is even more astounding when examining
the trajectories of high school dropouts. Amongst African Americans, the ratio of incar-
cerated men with less than 12 years of completed education to those with at least some
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White imprisonment ratio amongst those with no more than a high school
degree has remained relatively stable at around 4.0. When comparing birth
cohorts of individuals born in 1945–1949 on the one hand and those born
in 1975–1979 on the other, estimated probabilities of imprisonment over the
life course (as opposed to at single time points) reveal that for those with no
post-secondary education, the cumulative incarceration risk has grown about
twofold – from 10.2% to 18.0% – for Blacks and about sixfold – from 0.7% to
4.1% – for Whites (Western and Wildeman, 2009: 231). Moreover, in recent
years, the racial gap in imprisonment has narrowed somewhat due to de-
clining incarceration rates amongst Blacks – whose middle- and upper-class
fractions have become increasingly differentiated, thus escaping the clutch
of the penal apparatus (Wacquant, 2010) – and rising incarceration rates
amongst (poor) Whites, who have experienced steady growth in confinement
in the past couple of decades. This is especially true of the White jail incar-
ceration rate, which has nearly doubled from 135 to 255 inmates per 100,000
population between 1990 and 2013 (Subramanian et al., 2018).
Spatial variation in carceral inflation ranges from twofold increases in
states such as Maine or Massachusetts to sixfold growth in states such as
Louisiana and Mississippi (Western, 2006: 42). Before the turn of the cen-
college attendance has galloped from around 3.0 to over 17.0 between 1972 and 2010. For
Whites, the corresponding figures are roughly 2.0 and 25.0 (see National Research Council,
2014: 65). It is worth noting, however, that the number of high school dropouts as a share
of the total population has undergone significant changes in recent decades, whilst the
share of those with no more than a high school degree has remained more or less stable
at approximately 40%, which is why data on the latter group are presented in the main
body of the text.
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tury, between 1972 and 2000, the former two states experienced imprisonment
growth equivalent to between 150 and 200 additional prisoners per 100,000
population, whilst the latter two states added over 600 prisoners per 100,000
(National Research Council, 2014: 43). By the end of 2015, states like Maine,
Massachussetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont held around 300 in-
dividuals in local jails or state prisons per 100,000 population, whereas states
like Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma held roughly 900 indi-
viduals per 100,000 population (Keable and Glaze, 2016). Nested within
states, urban areas of concentrated disadvantage, such as Chicago’s afore-
mentioned territories of urban relegation, experience incarceration rates more
than forty times higher than privileged White communities and three times
higher than communities with a similar crime rate (Sampson and Loeffler,
2010: 27–28; see also Sampson, 2012). Similarly, in the wake of economic
desolation, Detroit’s deindustrialised wasteland has undergone a social trans-
formation so profound that the number of its inhabitants under correctional
supervision outweighs the number holding union jobs in the city’s manufac-
turing plants (Thompson, 2010: 708).
The above snapshot of the sociospatial dynamics of the American carceral
state strongly suggests the need to study economic decline and penal expan-
sion – and their potential role in the overdose epidemic – in tandem rather
than in isolation from one another. A rich body of evidence (to be reviewed
in the coming chapters) ties incarceration to a variety of factors that are as-
sociated with drug overdoses and, more broadly, with inequalities in health
(Link and Phelan, 1995), such as stigma, joblessness, family disruption, and
neighbourhood decline (for a recent study, see Western [2018]). Nonetheless,
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virtually no existing research has sought to link the over half a million drug-
related deaths that have occurred over the past three and a half decades or
the rapid increase in the health gap between the top and the bottom of the
social order to the gargantuan expansion of the penal state since the early
1970s. The penal state, despite its unique place in American society, has re-
mained conspicuously absent from research and policy debates surrounding
“deaths of despair” and health inequality. Indeed, in the 80-page Brookings
document containing both Case and Deaton’s latest analysis and supplemen-
tary comments and debates, including lengthy responses by two prominent
economists, David Cutler and Adriana Lleras-Muney, not a single mention is
made of one of the most singular and consequential developments in Amer-
ican social policy in recent decades as a potential cause of declining health
and deepening health inequality.
My argument, which I shall theoretically expound and empirically sub-
stantiate in the following chapters, is twofold. On the one hand, I leverage
insights from previous research to investigate the role of resource shocks –
such as job destruction and income decline – in driving the rise of Amer-
ica’s public health crisis. On the other, I argue that such resource shocks
must be viewed in tandem with the set of institutions that abet or abate
broader structures of inequality. More specifically, I propose that the dis-
tinctive feature of the American case is a shift in political emphasis from
the protective to the corrective wing of the policy apparatus, of which the
most pronounced manifestation is the historically unprecedented expansion
of the penal state. Research has established that the rise in incarceration was
not merely the result of increases in crime rates (Wacquant, 2009; National
xxiv
Figure 5: Cross-national differences in mortality rates from drug use disorders between
selected countries in 2016. Data source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation.
xxv
Figure 6: Cross-national differences in drug-related mortality trends between selected coun-
tries between 1990 and 2014. Data source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation.
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Figure 7: Cross-national differences in prison incarceration rates between selected coun-
tries. Data source: World Prison Brief, Institute for Criminal Policy Research.
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Figure 8: Evolution of the American correctional population between 1980 and 2011. Data
source: Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. See Figure 2-4 in National Research
Council (2014: 41).
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Research Council, 2014). Rather, it was primarily the result of a series of
sentencing reforms that included mandatory sentences for drug convictions
and so-called “three strikes” and “truth in sentencing” laws (however, see
Pfaff, 2017). These policies were themselves produced by a heightened focus
on crime that reflected sensationalisation in the mass media and electoral
considerations, in which Democrat and Republican candidates competed to
be “tough on crime” (Beckett, 1997; Tonry, 1999; Smith, 2004). That there
is a (causal) link between the size of America’s correctional population and
the magnitude of the ongoing overdose epidemic is a hypothesis that has
received scarce attention at best. The objective of this thesis is to fill this
gap, especially by relating the social structure of health inequality to the
dynamics of American capitalism.
Thesis overview
The thesis is divided into two main parts. Part I is devoted, on the one
hand, to conceptualising the phenomena under investigation, and, on the
other hand, to historicising their emergence and ramifications. In chapter 1,
I outline a theoretical framework that unifies seemingly disparate approaches
to the study of health and illness. I advocate the analytic lens offered by the
political economy of public health, which weds insights from various strands
of social scientific research into a coherent and comprehensive mode of in-
vestigation. Chapter 2 retraces the historical dynamics of deindustrialisation
and the political responses to subsequent socioeconomic convulsions that
have led to the rise of the penal state, but also to a broader range of policy
xxix
mechanisms by which inequalities are produced and perpetuated. Chapter 3
outlines a series of hypotheses surrounding the causal pathways and mecha-
nisms by which the interlocking dynamics of economic decline and punitive
social policy can materialise as socially patterned distributions of disability,
disease, and death, thus setting the stage for the subsequent analyses.
Part II comprises a series of empirical analyses. In chapter 4, I examine
the association(s) between economic decline, jail and prison incarceration,
and age-standardised mortality rates from drug use disorders at the U.S.
county level between 1980 and 2014. Chapter 5 offers a second set of empirical
analyses of broader inequalities in all-cause mortality rates, in premature
mortality risk, and in life expectancy at birth at the county level between
1980 and 2014. Finally, in chapter 6, I assess the roles of deindustrialisation
and prison incarceration rates in driving variation in life expectancy at age
40 in the top and bottom income quartiles at the state level between 2001
and 2014.
All the empirical chapters of which Part II is composed are modified
versions of journal articles that are either currently under peer review or,
in the case of chapter 6, have already been published (Nosrati et al., 2018).
In all cases, I have designed the study, conducted the empirical analysis,
and interpreted the results as lead author. I acknowledge the important
contributions of my co-authors – Michael Ash, Jacob Kang-Brown, Lawrence
King, Michael Marmot, and Martin McKee.6






The social science of unequal
life chances
1.1 Introduction
The sociological notion of “life chances” is derived from Max Weber’s famous
account of class situations, described as a shared set of probabilistically de-
fined opportunity structures by which groups and individuals gain access to
and appropriate social goods (Weber, 1978: 302, 927). That life chances vary
systematically across social classes (and – to remain faithful to the Webe-
rian idiom – across status groups) has in many ways constituted a starting
point for sociological investigations of inequality. However, such investiga-
tions have tended, more often than not, to ignore that form of inequality of
which the notion of life chances offers an almost literal echo, namely inequal-
ities in life and death. In the present chapter, I seek to offer a conceptual
basis for a social science of unequal life chances – one which spotlights dis-
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parities in health and wellbeing, but as seen in tandem with (rather than
in contradistinction to) the socially patterned distribution of material and
symbolic goods. Moreover, I put a macroscopic emphasis on the upstream
causal factors that generate and stratify probabilistically defined life course
trajectories (cf. Beckfield, 2018) without forsaking the theoretical conception
of the human animal as a sociospatially situated creature of flesh and blood
(cf. Krieger, 2005; 2011; Wacquant, 2015). To achieve this, I proceed as fol-
lows. First, I offer an analytic definition of inequality and describe its three
principal manifestations – namely resource inequality, existential inequality,
and vital inequality (Therborn, 2013). Second, I outline three competing
approaches to explaining vital inequality and explicate why I view the po-
litical economy of public health as the most potent. Finally, I unpack this
latter framework by detailing its theoretical underpinnings, conceptual ap-
paratus, and analytic assumptions, before outlining how it will be applied in
the forthcoming analyses.
1.2 Inequality: forging an analytic concept
The concept of inequality has undergone a distinct transformation in recent
times, passing from a state of pervasive neglect to one of widespread ap-
propriation in public discourse, notably so after the publication of Thomas
Piketty’s mammoth tome on Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty,
2014). Its buzzword-like diffusion has conferred upon it a somewhat hack-
neyed quality, wrought by a mix of overexposure and persistent ideological
tension. For the social scientist, such a development has the twofold implica-
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tion of raising public awareness of a crucial domain of social life and enquiry,
but also of seeing an analytic category contract an enduring sense of indeter-
minacy. Not only does the emergent phraseology of “inequality” lend itself
to varying discursive (ab)use but it can also serve to dilute the concept to
the point that its internal rigour risks annulment. This is exemplified by the
conflation of inequality and difference, or an assumed (but restrictive) equiv-
alency between inequality and income distribution. Nonetheless, the concept
does not need to be forsaken, provided it is analytically (re)constructed.
In what follows, I construe the concept of inequality as distinct from
that of mere difference or multiplicity in that it captures and reflects the
ways in which societally organised power governs the distribution of both
material and symbolic goods. The most widely used definition of power – “the
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to
carry out [their] own will despite resistance” (Weber, 1978: 53) – stresses its
distributive aspect, i.e. the power of A over B. As noted by Mann (2012),
this can be complemented by a more functional aspect whereby power is
manifest in the sociospatially embedded capacity for collective organisation.
Both of these dimensions of power are present in Marx’s emphasis on the
interplay between “objectified” and “living” labour (Marx, 2000: 400), or,
equivalently, in Bourdieu’s emphasis on the capacity to “appropriate social
energy” (Bourdieu, 1986: 241).1 Inequality is thus an expression of socially
sanctioned disparities in human capabilities to function and flourish (cf. Sen,
1 Once again, the almost vitalist character of these phrases, echoing that of life chances,
has remained conspicuously underexplored in sociological research. An interesting com-
parison can be made with the simple physical definition of power – the rate of doing work
per unit time.
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1995), anchored in macroscopic institutional configurations (such as state-
crafting), bolstered by material infrastructures (the built environment), and
durably inscribed into minds and bodies (the lived experience of symbolic
categories).2 It can be “soft” and latent, irretrievably lodged in the deepest
infolds of the social unconscious, entombed in the immanence of a lifeworld
(Lebenswelt), or it can be coercively enforced, via legitimate authority or –
when push comes to shove – through the active deployment of concentrated
lethal violence.
Following Göran Therborn, I differentiate between three forms of inequal-
ity. Resource inequality refers to the skewed distribution of income and
wealth, but also of knowledge and cultural goods – i.e. what provides social
agents with “unequal resources to act”. Existential inequality is defined as
“the unequal allocation of personhood, i.e., of autonomy, dignity, degrees of
freedom, and of rights to respect and self-development”. Finally, vital in-
equality – which forms the crux of the present plot – designates “socially
constructed unequal life-chances of human organisms” (Therborn, 2013: 49).
2 The reader may ask, why “sanctioned” (as compared to, say, “produced”)? Inequal-
ity – especially what Charles Tilly (1999) dubbed “durable inequality” – is wrought by
socially embedded and organisationally fashioned relations of power. Compliance with the
established order is not necessarily located at the level of consciousness, but does, from
time to time, need to be reinforced through collective organisation from above (one tends
to forget that those at the top typically have a much richer, or at least more effective,
“action repertoire” [Tilly, 2006] than those at the bottom). The victims of inequality need
not always comply because they have “internalised” the status quo, but may simply do so,
as Michael Mann puts it, “because they lack collective organization to do otherwise, be-
cause they are embedded within collective and distributive power organizations controlled
by others. They are organizationally outflanked” (Mann, 2012: 7).
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These three forms of inequality are irreducible but in no way mutually exclu-
sive (ibid : 53, Table 3), and in my analysis I underscore how all three remain
reciprocally mediated.
1.3 Three explanatory frameworks
In a famous passage in The Strategy of Genes, the biologist Conrad Wadding-
ton likens the process of cellular differentiation, whereby a cell transitions
from a state of pluripotency to one of tissue-specific specialisation, to the
trajectory of a marble rolling down an unevenly shaped hill (Waddington,
2014: 29). The pathway leading from the top to the bottom of the hill is
mediated by a multilayered probability structure as defined by the troughs
along the hillside, capable of tilting the marble’s trajectory in one direction
or another.3 In a similar vein, Francis Galton demonstrated, already in 1889,
that the passage of marbles (or, in his thought experiment, beans) through a
“Quincunx” – a funnel containing a vertical board studded with strategically
positioned pegs – is subject to a probabilistically defined destination struc-
ture that is largely independent of the individual marbles themselves (Galton,
3 It is worth noting that Waddington’s book was originally published only one year
before John Gurdon’s discovery that even fully specialised cells (that is, cells that are
located somewhere at the very bottom of Waddington’s landscape) contain all the genetic
information of pluripotent cells (i.e. cells located near the top of the hill) (Gurdon et
al., 1958). This foreshadowed the demonstration, decades later, that under the right
circumstances, pluripotency can be induced by effacing the epigenetic signature fostered
by cellular differentiation (Takahashi and Yamanaka, 2006). In other words, a given
destination structure is neither inevitable nor necessarily irreversible.
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1889). Both Galton’s “Quincunx” and Waddington’s “epigenetic landscape”
offer helpful metaphors for the social science of unequal life chances (cf.
Krieger, 2012). They evoke the simple question of what determines these
structured pathways to begin with: how come some marbles end up at point
A rather than at point B (or C or D or E, etc.)? Put differently, why are
resources, status, and longevity unequally distributed across social and phys-
ical space? What generates the systematic patterning of human trajectories?
In statistical jargon, what is the “data generating process”? And, more spe-
cific to this particular research, how can persistent disparities in health and
wellbeing be scientifically explained?
For lack of offering an exhaustive account of diverse approaches to the
study of vital inequality,4 I will confine this conceptual sketch to a dis-
tinction between three principal explanatory frameworks. The first, which
currently dominates the fields of medicine, public health, and epidemiol-
ogy (McMichael, 1999), is one that emphasises the proximal determinants of
health (see Birn et al., 2017: 90–92). This framework encompasses two main
internal models. The biomedical model is characterised by three distinctive
features: (a) it restricts its attention to biological, chemical, and physical
phenomena; (b) it espouses a methodological approach that privileges (ran-
domised) clinical trials or, more generally, a potential outcomes conception
of causality;5 and (c) it tends to adopt the view that phenomena are best
4 For an extensive overview of different varieties of epidemiological theory, their histo-
ries, and their interconnections, see Krieger (2011).
5 See Krieger and Davey Smith (2016) and accompanying comments in a special issue
of the International Journal of Epidemiology for a critical discussion of epidemiological
conceptualisations of causality.
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explained by the properties of their parts (Krieger, 2011: 130). Despite its
drive to identify previously unknown pathogenic biological mechanisms and
to promote large-scale investments in a range of clinical (especially phar-
macological) interventions, this model is entirely bereft of the capacity to
explain population-level inequalities in health, other than via recourse to an
aggregated description of differences in biological make-up between individ-
uals. Its methodological individualism is oriented towards the dissociation of
discrete units of analysis – that is, individuals composed more or less uniquely
of biological, chemical, or physical traits – from their broader ecological habi-
tat. The lifestyle model, on the other hand, relies on a perspective according
to which unequal exposure to “risk factors” is a product of differences in
behaviour, especially consumer behaviours related to smoking, physical ex-
ercise, and diet (ibid : chapter 5, especially pages 140–148). To account for
the ongoing overdose epidemic, for instance, this framework highlights the
supply of opioids and other drugs, coupled with the “choices” or “incentives”
to consume them, as key determinants of inequality. Whilst this approach
has the merit of tracking micro-level behaviours that are detrimental to pop-
ulation health, it fails – much like the biomedical approach – to relate such
behaviours to structural constraints that lie beyond the scope of the individ-
ual (or groups of aggregated individuals) and falls short of explaining how
such behaviours are generated in the first place, why they remain socially
patterned, or why they are subject to substantial variation across time and
space. In short, this framework has limited, if any, capacity to unpack the
layered pathways of Waddington’s landscape or Galton’s board.
The second framework is that of social epidemiology, which takes an im-
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portant step in the direction of providing a more relational understanding
of health and illness. As opposed to the biomedical or lifestyle approach, it
highlights the importance of social context, it posits that social phenomena
can causally impact distributions of health and disease, and it recognises
that population health is a dynamic, not a static phenomenon (ibid : chapter
6). Chief amongst the social determinants of health are factors like poverty,
unemployment, income inequality, racial discrimination, or neighbourhood
context (Marmot, 2005; Berkman et al., 2014). This strand of research has
experienced continued success in recent years, and has shed crucial light
on how social, behavioural, and biological phenomena must be viewed as
pathogenically integrated. Moreover, it arguably offers the first conceptu-
ally and empirically coherent explanation for the existence (and persistence)
of social inequalities in life and death. However, although it moves further
up the causal chain than do the biomedical and lifestyle models, it rarely
examines the social determinants of the social determinants of health. As
argued by Anne-Emmanuelle Birn, social epidemiology claims to examine
“the causes of the causes” of ill health and inequality, but remains conspicu-
ously silent when it come to the causes of “the causes of the causes” (Birn,
2009). In other words, it rarely asks why factors like poverty, unemployment,
or discrimination materialise in the first place. To revisit our metaphor, it
recognises that marbles can follow different – socially mediated – pathways
but asks few questions about the (political and economic) roots of existing
population distributions and destination structures.
The third and final framework, which is the one adopted in this thesis,
is that of the political economy of public health. This is an emergent (some
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would say re-emergent) research stream that seeks to understand the dis-
tal social, economic, and political causes of population health (cf. Doyal,
1979; McKinlay, 1979). What distinguishes it from the previous two frame-
works is not only its macroscopic lens, geared towards unpacking large-scale
phenomena that fashion or fissure, design or disrupt entire societies, but its
primordial attention to the societal organisation of power (see Birn et al.,
2017: 101–103). This is ultimately what renders it capable of accounting
for the making, remaking, or unmaking of (vital) inequality. It thus probes
the societal (not just social) determinants of ill health and locates existing
social phenomena in the context of broader historical and political dynamics
(Krieger, 2011: 185; Birn et al., 2017: chapter 3; see also Krieger and Beck-
field, 2009). In short, it retraces the structural properties that determine
the distributional features of Waddington’s landscape or Galton’s “Quin-
cunx” (Beckfield, 2018). Examples of such an approach include studies of
the effects of mass privatisation policies in driving the post-communist mor-
tality crisis (Stuckler et al., 2009); the impact of austerity policies on mental
health in Europe (Reeves et al., 2016); the role of corporations in shaping un-
healthy behaviour like smoking and unhealthy food and drink consumption
(Stuckler et al., 2012); the structural connections between work(lessness) and
health inequality (Bambra, 2011); or the profound effects of institutionalised
racism – in the form of Jim Crow laws – on inequities in infant mortality rates
across American states (Krieger et al., 2013). This constitutes a return to
the origins of public health, captured by Rudolph Virchow’s famous dictum:
“Medicine is a social science, and politics is nothing more than medicine on
a grand scale” (Virchow, 1848).
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1.4 Putting the political economy of public
health to work
My usage of this framework rests on three analytic pillars. First, I construe
current social, political, and economic forces are layered sediments of the
past. “The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on
the brain of the living”, as Marx (2000: 454) famously said in 1852. In the
1867 preface to Das Kapital, he adds that “[we] suffer not only from the
living, but from the dead. Le mort saisit le vif [the dead man clutches onto
the living]!” (Marx, 1976: 91). Insofar as social science may be defined as
a “history of the present” (to paraphrase Foucault [1995]), I will therefore
seek to historicise the determinants of unequal life chances. This will be
the principal focus of chapter 2, where I retrace the emergence and ramifi-
cations of deindustrialisation, penal expansion, and punitive social policy in
the American context.
Second, insofar as this framework pays particular heed to the societal
organisation of power, I posit that the emergence, morphology, and dynam-
ics of (vital) inequality must be explicitly related to the logics of capitalism
(Marx, 1976). Capitalism, as a distinctive historical phenomenon based on
institutionalised relations of power, can (for present purposes) be defined as a
system of generalised commodity production characterised by (a) the private
ownership of the major means of production, (b) formally free labour, and
(c) the invention of credit-money, all under the aegis of a strong bureaucratic
state.6 This entails an emphasis on what Weber dubbed the “memorable al-
6 For discussions of alternative definitions, see e.g. Ingham (2011), Kocka (2016), or
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liance” between the state and a relatively autonomous economic elite (Weber,
1978: 353) through which inequalities between labour and capital are embed-
ded in the social relations of production and ratified through the deployment
of bureaucratic rationality. Different modalities of this very “alliance” and its
political and economic consequences are central to understanding the roots of
rapid industrial decline and the crafting of social policy in the United States,
as will be described in the next chapter.
Third (and here I complete my recourse to sociology’s foundational in-
sights, this time by drawing on Durkheim), I spotlight the social alchemy
whereby symbolic representations – and their dissolution – morph into endur-
ing material realities that shape the trajectories of individuals and collectives
alike (Durkheim, 2002; 2008). Insofar as institutions (from labour markets
to prisons) can be construed as “realised categories” (Bourdieu, 1993a), i.e.
as materialisations of social principles of vision and division, they organise
power not only through the distribution of tangible resources but also through
the enforcement of symbolic schemas (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Beckfield,
2018: 17–23). The focus on macro-level institutional arrangements enabled
by the political economy of public health thus implies an engagement with
the (re)production of categories and classifications that prove consequen-
tial for the making of life chances, including (for instance) those involved in
ethno-racial formation or embodied stigma and social relegation.
How do these analytic and conceptual foundations map onto my applica-
Hodgson (2016). For a rich discussion of American capitalism in light of recent historical
scholarship, see Beckert and Rockman (2016) and Beckert and Desan (2018). For a broader
historical (and historiographical) account, see Kocka and van der Linden (2016).
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tion of the political economy of public health in the present study? In the
forthcoming chapters, I seek to explain the state of America’s population
health landscape with reference to the ripple effects of socioeconomic disrup-
tion – notably in the form of industrial decline – and the political responses
to such developments, especially in the guise of high rates of incarceration.
On the one hand, I view deindustrialisation as a historically distinct mani-
festation of “creative destruction” (to borrow Schumpeter’s [1994] evocative
phrase) propelled by the dynamics, both internal and global, of American
capitalism. On the other hand, the historically unprecedented expansion of
the penal apparatus is construed as part of a broader public policy reper-
toire through which attendant social divisions are curbed and controlled,
managed and magnified. The potency of the political economy approach is
easily identified when considering that spatial variation in life chances across
the United States is politically and economically driven, conveyed by the
consequential legacies of economic decline in Appalachia and the Rust Belt
on the one hand, and of slavery and institutionalised racial domination in
the South on the other, not to mention that within-U.S. variation is itself
politically rooted in the institution(s) of federalism (Beckfield, 2018: 77, 79;
see also Kunitz, 2015).
At the intersection of these macro-level developments is the (welfare)
state. The latter may be construed as a wide-ranging stratification machine
which operates, in the words of Gösta Esping-Andersen, “not just [as] a mech-
anism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality;
it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the
ordering of social relations” (Esping-Andersen, 1989: 23). By virtue of its
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monopoly on the legitimate exercise of physical and symbolic violence (Bour-
dieu, 1993b; Weber, 2004), the state forms the locus of social struggle for the
division between “insiders” and “outsiders”, between those who “belong” and
those who do not, between the “deserving” and the “underserving”, and it
thus actively fabricates the subjective and objective conditions undergirding
unequal life chances. Incarceration is a primal example of this power. The
prison is a politically rooted institution that actively stratifies a population,
delineates and aligns group boundaries, and thus inscribes symbolic divisions
into materiality by institutionalising social categories (Shannon and Uggen,
2012). In a word, the prison is a pivot of exclusionary closure and thus an
upstream determinant of inequality.
Social policy is typically seen as encompassing a set of government in-
terventions in the realms of employment, pensions, housing, and health care
– but not criminal justice. However, the conceptualisation of penal policy
as social policy can be motivated on at least two levels. At the historical
level, it is worth recalling that the initial conception of the prison in late
sixteenth-century Europe, before ever being construed as a unique tool of
punishment or rehabilitation, was as “an instrument of social policy with
regard to beggars” (Geremek, 1994: 207), geared towards the regulation and
invisibilisation of poverty at the dawn of modern capitalism. A means of
warehousing landless vagrants uprooted by the enclosure movement and of
curbing the social convulsions wrought by the commodification of labour,
the penal wing of the (welfare) state thus historically preceded the currently
more familiar social wing that emerged in the late nineteenth century un-
der the press of industrialisation. Moreover, the social wing itself has not
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only been oriented towards providing security for society’s most vulnerable
but, historically, has derived from an active conservative effort to quell the
revolutionary leanings of the early labour movement and to sanctify loyalty
to the state by managing some of the most deleterious effects of industrial
capitalism at the bottom of the class structure, as evidenced by the rise of
welfare policies under Napoleon III in France, under Bismarck in Germany,
or under von Taaffe in Austria (see Esping-Andersen, 1989: chapter 2; see
also Piven and Cloward, 1993). From this it may be argued that, at the
analytic level, the dissociation of penal policy with social policy is little but
a symptom of disciplinary sectarianism. Bringing social policy and criminal
justice together conceptually within a single framework not only dissolves an
arbitrary boundary between mutually imbricated objects of empirical enquiry
but also facilitates a broader, unifying understanding of the interconnections
between different flanks of the same political economy of inequality (Beckett
and Western, 2001; Wacquant, 2009). Such a unifying endeavour is one of
the principal objectives of the present research.
By construing incarceration as social policy, I draw on existing empirical
and theoretical research on the role of the welfare state in the making of vital
inequality (see Bambra, 2007; Eikemo and Bambra, 2008; Lundberg et al.,
2008; Beckfield et al., 2015; Beckfield and Bambra, 2016). However, following
Löıc Wacquant, I also view the penal state as embedded in a broader recon-
figuration of the “memorable alliance” between state and capital, geared to-
wards punitive interventionism at the bottom of the American class structure
and protective guardianship at the top (Wacquant, 2009; 2010). As I will ex-
pound in the next chapter, this entails the retrenchment of social assistance
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for the most vulnerable, the reorienting of welfare towards workfare, and the
expansion of the penal system; but it also entails a generous welfare sys-
tem for the wealthy (Faricy, 2016), coupled with the re-regulation of broader
institutional dynamics in favour of corporations (Domhoff, 2014). Drawing
on the work of Jason Beckfield and colleagues, I conceptually designate this
phenomenon as institutional imbrication, which refers to the “simultaneous
operation of institutions in multiple domains at multiple levels” (Beckfield
et al., 2015: 233), notably through the “[combination of] multiple policy
exposures and [channelling of] their overlapping effects to variable parts of
the population” (Beckfield, 2018: 121). Crucially, this concept “allows for
amplifying, cross-cutting or moderating effects of institutional arrangements,
accurately reflecting the reality that people ‘live’ more than one policy at a
time over the life course” (ibid : 126).
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that inequality is an expression of socially sanc-
tioned disparities in human capabilities to function and flourish that manifest
as resource inequality, existential inequality, and vital inequality. Further,
I have argued that the political economy of public health offers a unique
framework through which the upstream determinants of vital inequality can
be grasped. It is distinct from other predominant frameworks in its attention
to the societal organisation of power through which unequal life chances are
produced and reproduced. It historicises overlapping patterns of inequality
and retraces their embeddedness in macro-level institutional configurations
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that govern the distribution of material and symbolic goods. In seeking to
shed novel light on the roots of deepening vital inequality in the United
States, I have emphasised the need to study the structure and dynamics of
capitalism, with a special focus on the operations of the (welfare) state in




(Vital) inequality and the
dynamics of capitalism
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to situate my object of analysis in a historically
anchored set of developments of American capitalism. I begin by sketching
the history of industrial decline in the post-World War II period, which has
been at the centre of public and academic debates surrounding economic
change and inequality at the dawn of the 21st century. I will argue that key
features of deindustrialisation, notably the reallocation of investment across
economic sectors and the selective reterritorialisation of economic activity,
must be related to the logics of capital and its “conceptions of control” (cf.
Fligstein, 1990). I will describe the ripple effects of deindustrialisation on
the social patterning of (un)employment relations, concentrated poverty, and
social relegation. In a second step, I will examine the parallel expansion of
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the American penal state since the early 1970s and detail its core institutional
properties. Finally, I will connect penal policy to social policy more broadly,
and will examine the socially differentiated structure of the American welfare
state, which operates in deeply contrasting ways across different layers of the
class structure.
2.2 The political economy of “creative de-
struction”
Three empirical facts surrounding American deindustrialisation stand out.
First, as a share of total national non-farm employment, manufacturing em-
ployment has undergone a continual decline in recent decades, falling from
32% in 1948 to 8% in 2017. The number of workers employed in the man-
ufacturing sector reached a peak in 1979, counting over 19 million, and hit
its lowest level mid-recession in 2010, with just over 11 million. However,
the net manufacturing employment change of -6.6 million between 1977 and
2012 masks additional gross flows that have caused major dislocations within
the labour force. Second, manufacturing employment dropped by 12% be-
tween 1979 and 2000, then plummeted by another 25% between 2000 and
2012. And third, this decline has unfurled in parallel with a steady increase
in labour productivity in the manufacturing sector over the same period, as
evidenced by rising real output and close to $2.5 trillion real value added just
before the 2009 recession, compared to around $0.5 trillion in the late 1950s
(Fort et al., 2018; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.). The root causes
of these developments are contested (see e.g. Rodwin and Sazanami, 1989;
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Alderson, 1999; Brady and Denniston, 2006), but the extant literature con-
verges around two explanatory factors, namely globalisation-induced trade
competition and technological change.1
A number of econometric studies suggest that Chinese import penetra-
tion may have accounted for one quarter – or, in some model specifications,
up to one half – of the overall employment decline in manufacturing since
2000 (Autor et al., 2013; see also Bernard et al., 2006; Autor et al., 2014;
Acemoglu et al., 2015; Pierce and Schott, 2016a). It is worth highlighting
the difference between direct imports, i.e. finished goods, and import pen-
etration, which involves heterogeneous corporate sourcing decisions across
domestic and foreign supply chains. These two modalities of economic activ-
ity seem to have divergent effects on employment patterns, with the latter
having a stronger association with job destruction in manufacturing than the
former (Antràs et al., 2017). Other studies have tried to isolate exogenous
variation in automation, finding that the adoption of industrial robots or
the computerisation of routine tasks precipitate further employment declines
(Autor et al., 2015; Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, 2015; Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2017). However, the overall trend has been one of simultaneous
rises in import penetration and technology adoption, rendering the forced
disentangling of the two processes a potentially futile endeavour. Existing
evidence shows that the rate of technology adoption as a share of firms in the
manufacturing sector underwent a steady increase at the tail end of the pre-
vious century, before jumping up around the time of establishing Permanent
1 Notwithstanding those who view deindustrialisation as an inevitable and natural
consequence of economic development (e.g. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997).
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Normal Trade Relations to China in October 2000. Computerisation within
American plants grew from less than 5% of all firms in 1977 to over 20% in
2000, at which point it galloped to reach over 60% in 2002, following which
it declined somewhat but remained at a high level (over 40%). At the same
time, import penetration grew steadily from less than 10% in 1977 to just
over 20% in 2000, and to around 30% by 2012 (Fort et al., 2018: 52, Figure
2). Indeed, it may be that technological change is itself a response to trade
shocks (ibid : 54; cf. Acemoglu, 2002; Oldenski, 2014).
Insofar as the principal dispute in the economics literature surrounding
deindustrialisation focuses on the relative explanatory capacity of trade ver-
sus technology, the question of (corporate) power has been largely neglected
in mainstream accounts. Automation and other technological change may
not only be endogenous to trade liberalisation, but both developments are
embedded in broader power dynamics, as evidenced by how the designs of
trade agreements typically reflect the interests of politically well-connected
firms, such as international banks, pharmaceutical companies, and other
multinational corporations (for a recent discussion, see Rodrik, 2018). More-
over, as the above figures suggest, trade competition from low-wage coun-
tries and attendant technological changes involved in the production process
only account for a given portion of degrading employment parameters and
wage stagnation or decline amongst workers. Most importantly, these de-
velopments alone do not seem to account for the increased share of surplus
appropriated by capital. In 2014, the share of national income earned by the
top 1% of adults (approximately 2 million individuals) in the United States
equalled around 20%, compared to only 13% for the bottom 50% of the adult
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population (approximately 117 million individuals), marking an almost ex-
act reversal since the mid-1970s, when the corresponding figures were around
11% and 20%, respectively. Thus virtually the entire 60% increase in aver-
age pre-tax real national income per adult since 1980 has gone to the top
income earners, who enjoyed an average income of over $1.3 million in 2014,
whilst income in the bottom half of the population has stagnated at around
$16,500 per annum (one-fourth of the average national income), with the
modest post-tax income growth in this group being absorbed by increased
health spending (Piketty et al., 2018). This has been coupled with tripled
wealth concentration amongst the top 0.1% wealth holders, from 7% of total
national wealth in 1978 to 22% in 2012, and a sharply declining wealth share
in the bottom 90%, from a peak of over 35% in the mid-1980s to around 22%
in 2012, as a result of sapped savings and burgeoning mortgage, consumer,
and student debts (Saez and Zucman, 2016; see also Alvaredo et al., 2018).
These patterns of resource inequality can be related to those of industrial
decline. The distributional impacts of trade liberalisation have principally
manifested as occupational polarisation and wage repression amongst low-
educated, low-skill workers, especially for those working in industries that
were disproportionately affected by tariff reductions under the North At-
lantic Free Trade Agreement. A comparison of the manufacturing sector
with unaffected industries suggests a drop in wage growth of 17 percentage
points associated with trade shocks between 1990 and 2000 (Hakobyan and
McLaren, 2016; see also Oldenski, 2014). Statistically robust but smaller
adverse impacts have been associated with technological change across both
employment and wage parameters (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017; see also
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Autor et al., 2015; Graetz and Michaels, 2017). Meanwhile, overall corpo-
rate profits have increased sharply, standing at over $1.9 trillion (after tax)
in 2014. In the manufacturing sector, employment declines are overshadowed
by rapid value-added growth, with corporate profits reaching close to $500
billion in the same year (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, n.d.).
The political economy of “creative destruction” can be gleaned from three
significant structural patterns. First, it is noteworthy that net firm death ac-
counts for no more than a quarter of overall industrial decline between 1977
and 2012, and variation across establishments nested within firms in con-
tinuous operation accounts for over 60% of the overall employment change
(Fort et al., 2018: 50, 59–60, Figure 4). What is at stake is not the evap-
oration but the reallocation of capital, which can be achieved by redirect-
ing profits from one site of production to new facilities or other activities;
by failing to renew factors of production and maintaining a site of produc-
tion; by selling off a plant’s capital stock via subcontracting or outsourcing;
or, ultimately, by plant closure and complete relocation of production via
offshoring (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982: 7). However, such capital mobil-
ity relies on complex institutional configurations that allow corporations to
combine the spatial dispersal of production with the economic concentration
of ownership in their pursuit of compound accumulation and growth.2 The
2 Contrary to discourses linking globalisation to the evaporation of states and their bor-
ders, most available evidence suggests that assemblages of global operation, coordination,
and control are mediated by the state as the ultimate guarantor of the rights of capital
through the fabrication and enforcement of property rights, the protection of contracts,
the mobilisation of labour power, and the territorialisation of production processes (e.g.
Fligstein, 2001; Sassen, 2008; Panitch and Gindin, 2013). The state thus emerges as a core
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pursuit of profitability results in distinctly patterned capital shifts whereby
subsidiaries are bought and sold according to strategies designed to optimise
corporate portfolios (cf. Cowie, 2001).3 In the process, a drive for diversifi-
cation has propped up firm profits whilst leaving abandoned industries and
their production sites hollowed out. This drive intensified in the 1970s and
continued well beyond, as employment levels in non-manufacturing estab-
lishments owned by manufacturing firms grew steadily until around 2000, at
which point they plateaued (Fort et al., 2018: 67, Figure 7). The geography
of such capital mobility can be divided into a first stage, before the year
2000, during which the dominant trend was one of “domestic offshoring” as
seen in consistent employment reallocation away from organised labour in
the industrial heartland towards non-unionised and “pro-business” state re-
gions (Holmes, 1998; Bernard et al., 2013; Fort, 2017), until a second stage
facilitated the shifting of operations to low-wage foreign countries after the
supplier of institutional infrastructures suited to harnessing market dynamics in favour of
capital (cf. Campbell and Lindberg, 1990).
3 In their famous account of the early waves of deindustrialisation in the United States,
Bluestone and Harrison report that four categories emerged from the arraying of a product
line’s market share against the sales growth rate of each corporate activity: (i) lines with
both low market shares and growth rates; (ii) lines with high market shares but low
growth rates; (iii) lines with still low market shares but rapid growth rates; and (iv)
high-share, high-growth “star” lines. The codification offered in the 1970s by the Boston
Consulting Group, a distinguished management consulting firm, recommended completely
abandoning the first category (which failed to meet minimum profit targets, sometimes set
at no less than 25%), “milking” the second until a limit had been reached before shifting
investment to the third, whilst adopting a provisional laissez-faire attitude towards the
fourth (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982: 150–152).
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turn of the millennium.
Second, the drive for diversification has been accompanied by mergers
and acquisitions that contribute to oligopolistic concentrations of capital.
From the early years of industrialisation (cf. Beckert, 2003), this issued in a
mode of industrial organisation whereby absentee control of establishments,
i.e. remote management of production sites by central headquarters external
to and hence detached from local economies, allowed corporate operations
to cut across various social and spatial divides and further facilitated the
type of flexibility associated with rapid capital shifts, divestiture, and rein-
vestment (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982: 157; cf. Caves, 1980; Aaron, 1983;
Staudohar and Brown, 1987). Large corporations and conglomerates have
been disproportionately responsible for job destruction rates, and closures
have been more likely to occur in multinational, multi-plant firms (Bernard
and Jensen, 2002).
Third, the spatially differentiated drive to expand and contract has mo-
tivated the strategic erosion of organised labour in geographies where union
activism initially emerged, namely areas characterised by strong industrial
histories. The shifting of operations to the Sun Belt, to the non-unionised
peripheries of the North and the West, and to foreign establishments en-
compasses two prominent strategies. On the one hand, parallel production
lines can serve to undermine union shops via duplicate production facilities
in non-unionised geographies, allowing management to redirect production
to the latter in the case of strikes or other forms of turbulence in the for-
mer. On the other hand, multiple sourcing allows corporations to pit smaller
suppliers of components against one another by refusing to grant sole source
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arrangements to independent shops. This weakens local supplier production
runs and saps union density in supplier shops (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982:
166–167; see also Cowie, 1999; Lee, 2005).
On the level of legislation, the corporate community has developed an
interlocking web of organisational resources that actively shape government
policy outcomes (Domhoff, 2014; Gilens, 2014). From the 1935 National
Labor Relations (or Wagner) Act, which legalised organised unions and con-
ferred bargaining power over wages and work rules to their members, to the
1938 Fair Labor Standards Act, which inscribed minimum wages, the eight-
hour day, and the abolition of child labour in the wage-labour compact, the
labour movement was gaining ground in the pre-World War II economy (see
e.g. Dubofsky and McCartin, 2017). The social conquests of the New Deal
Era were compromised by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which undermined
union density and reoriented the social contract between labour and capital
towards a workfare regime under the banner of “right-to-work” laws. The
effectiveness of this legislative shift is illustrated by a rapid drop in levels of
unionisation in the United States since 1947: after reaching a historical high
of close to 35% following the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, there
has been a steady decline in the percentage of unionised workers in the years
following World War II until the present day (Carter et al., 2006). Between
1973 and 2007, private sector union membership plummeted from 34% to
8% for men and from 16% to 6% for women, whilst wage inequality grew
by over 40% (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011; cf. Mishel et al., 2012; see also
Denice and Rosenfeld, 2018). Similarly, the frequency of strikes and success-
ful union elections has plummeted drastically (Carter et al., 2006), whilst the
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real value of the median and minimum wages, as well as total earnings for
a full-time minimum wage job as a share of poverty earnings, have dwindled
since the late 1960s (Massey, 2008: 167–168).
Perhaps the most incisive sociological portrait of the early effects of dein-
dustrialisation has been furnished by William Julius Wilson’s study of The
Truly Disadvantaged (2012). Wilson chronicles the rapid social and economic
decomposition of the Black urban metropolis in the wake of industrial restruc-
turing by retracing the conjoint rise of pervasive joblessness, violent crime,
and family disintegration. Starting in the 1960s, what was previously the
receptacle of industrial labour power, harbouring a disproportionate number
of African Americans employed in blue-collar occupations, underwent an as-
tounding implosion whereby the urban ghetto was transformed from a dual
institutional device of ethno-racial seclusion and economic extraction into a
functionally obsolete container of social stigma, concentrated poverty, and
collective disarray (see also Wilson, 1997).4 Economic dislocation spawned
an increasingly dualised occupational structure that heightened insecurity
at the bottom of the class spectrum, where low-skill, low-educated African
Americans were mired in a situation of rampant unemployment punctuated
by precarious wage work. What Wilson dubs “concentration effects”, by
which he designates the sociospatially distinct cumulative experience of rel-
egation, were amplified by the rapid exodus of the Black middle class from
the collapsing ghetto, depriving those left behind of a social bulwark against
continued deprivation.
4 To compare the “communal” industrial ghetto to the deindustrialised “hyperghetto”,
see Drake and Cayton (2015) for the former and Wacquant (2008) for the latter.
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Whereas the early waves of industrial decline disproportionately impacted
African Americans (cf. Bound and Holzer, 2000), the continued deprole-
tarianisation of the American working class has had spillover effects across
ethno-racial boundaries (see Sugrue, 1996; Neel, 2018). Narrowing Black-
White employment ratios seem to be driven by increased within-category
differentiation. Over and above the effects of increased school enrolment,
labour force participation rates have declined by 3.2 percentage points amongst
prime-age Whites since 2000 (Hipple, 2016), and are falling precipitously
amongst those with no higher education (Case and Deaton, 2017). Overall
labour force participation rates amongst men aged 25 to 54 without college
degrees have declined by 6.4 percentage points between 1995 and 2015, and
by 5.9 percentage points since 2000 (Hipple, 2016), dropping below 85% af-
ter the 2008 recession (Krueger, 2017). Annual volatility around average
earnings amongst male workers doubled from 1974 to 2000 (Gottschalk and
Moffitt, 2009), and seems to have continued into the new century. Labour
market segmentation, union dissolution, and wage repression have fuelled
this development (Abraham and Kearny, 2018; Denice and Rosenfeld, 2018;
see also Western et al., 2012; Desmond and Western, 2018).
2.3 The rise of the penal state
The political response to the social and economic convulsions outlined above
has been largely punitive. As described in the Introduction, the American
penal state has undergone an expansion that is unparalleled, and it is the
sociospatially concentrated human remnants of large-scale economic degra-
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dation that form the principal clientele of the criminal justice system. To
assess the causes of rising incarceration rates, it is helpful to decompose the
main features of a growing prison population. The size of a prison popula-
tion can be thought of as a function of crime rates, the probability of arrest
given a crime, the probability of prison admission given an arrest, and the
duration of prison sentences (National Research Council, 2014: 47). What
configuration of these four elements has fostered the expansion of the penal
state in recent decades?
There is no unilinear connection between incarceration and crime rates.
In tandem with early waves of industrial decline, crime rates increased be-
tween the early 1960s and 1980s, as did incarceration rates (from 1973 on-
wards). However, whilst crime rates underwent a significant downswing in
the following two decades, especially from the early 1990s, incarceration rates
continued their strong upwards trajectory. This increase was seen across all
crime categories but especially for drug-related crime. Imprisonment rates
for drug offences jumped from 15 to 143 per 100,000 population between 1980
and 2010 (Beck and Blumenstein, 2012). Arrest rates per offences remained
largely stable between 1980 and 2010, although arrests for murder declined by
some 20% after year 2000 and arrests for aggravated assault grew marginally
before 2000. In contrast, drug law enforcement efforts manifested in the form
of rapidly rising arrest rates for drug possession and use, reaching a peak in
2006 at 162% above the 1980 level (National Research Council, 2014: 50).
Prison admissions rates per arrests also increased, mostly through commit-
ments related to murder offences – which grew from around 40 to over 90
prison commitments per 100 adult arrests – but also through assault and drug
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offences. Prison admissions for the latter category grew rapidly throughout
the 1980s but then flatlined after the early 1990s at around 10 prison com-
mitments per 100 adult arrests (Beck and Blumenstein, 2012). Finally, as
for time served in prison, conservative estimates suggest that sentence dura-
tion grew most dramatically for murder – by 238% between 1981 and 2000
– followed by sexual assault, which almost doubled between 1981 and 2009.
Interestingly, the smallest sentence duration increase was for drug offences,
which never exceeded 2 years, growing from 1.6 to 1.9 years between 1981
and 2000 and remaining stable at that level into the new century (ibid).
Overall, a decomposition of prison growth between 1980 and 2010 suggests
that changing prison commitments per arrest coupled with longer sentence
duration account for the bulk of the total variation (ibid). This largely cor-
responds to stricter enforcement for drug-related crimes under the “war on
drugs” on the one hand, starting in the 1970s under President Nixon, and
the subsequent wave of legislative moves to expand sentences. The advent of
new sentencing policies unfolded from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, dur-
ing which time a series of reforms were introduced to make sentences not only
harsher but also more consistently imposed for crimes related to drugs and
violence. This aim was primarily to be reached via mandatory minimum sen-
tences, “three strikes” laws, “truth in sentencing” laws, and laws introducing
the abrogation of parole for certain offences (see National Research Council,
2014: 71–85). As suggested by the above figures, those who serve the longer
sentences are primarily under lock and key for violent offences, notably mur-
der and assault, even as murder arrest rates have declined at century’s dawn.
Conversely, aggressive law enforcement for drug-related crimes have trans-
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lated into significantly higher admissions rates with relatively short sentences
(ibid : 54). This is reflected in how prisoners doing time for drug offences
make up about one-fifth of the total carceral population at any one point in
time, and prisoners doing time for non-violent drug offences make up only 6%
of the total (Pfaff, 2017). However, the dramatic rise of drug-related arrests
has translated into high turnover rates for minor offences, notably via local
county jails rather than state prisons. In 2014, state and federal prisons held
1,562,300 people, usually convicted of felonies with a sentence of 1 year or
more, whereas jails held 744,600 people who were predominantly in pre-trial
detention. Whilst at any point in time jails held about half as many people
as prisons, there were 11.4 million annual admissions to jails – almost twenty
times the 626,096 people newly admitted to prisons each year.
Caution is therefore warranted in interpreting statistics that are typi-
cally presented in the debate surrounding “mass incarceration”. The rise
of the penal state must also be viewed against the historical backdrop of
successive institutional forces by which the nexus of class and race has been
shaped throughout American history, from the institution of slavery to that
of incarceration via the Jim Crow system in the postbellum South and the
Black ghetto in the industrial North (see Wacquant, 2009: chapter 6; Muller,
2012; 2018). For instance, despite the fact that, based on virtually all ex-
isting sources of evidence, rates of cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin use
amongst Whites consistently surpass those of Blacks (National Research
Council, 2014: 50), the nominal share of drug crimes amongst African Amer-
icans jumped from around 30% to over 45% in the 1980s alone (Alexander,
2012). Equally telling is how law enforcement agencies have primarily tar-
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geted activities such as public urination, rough sleeping, or begging for food
(Thompson, 2010: 712), which is revelatory of a punitive treatment of poverty
rather than crime, fiercely levelled at select spaces of socioeconomic relega-
tion and concentrated disadvantage (Sampson and Loeffler, 2010).
The broader social and political conditions that were specific to the 1960s
and 1970s when the penal apparatus commenced its expansionary trajectory
are characterised by a number of major overlapping developments (see Na-
tional Research Council, 2014: chapter 4). Chief amongst them were the
mutually entangled political responses to the Civil Rights Movement, ethno-
racial division, and the ideological trope of “law and order”. The degree
to which these motivated the harsh turn in penal policy was subtended by
rising public anxiety surrounding upward-trending crime rates coupled with
a consistent bipartisan commitment to be “tough on crime” (Beckett, 1997;
Tonry, 1999; Smith, 2004). The tightened institutionalisation of corporate
power, the socioeconomic distress associated with deindustrialisation, and
accompanying spillover effects all fed into the punitive orientation of social
policy.
This is conveyed by the unfolding of the three (in)famous “wars” that per-
meated the mainstream policy discourse of the 1960s and the 1970s, namely
the “war on poverty”, the “war on crime”, and the “war on drugs”. Upon
their initial launch, President Johnson explicitly linked them together and
stressed the need to address the “root causes” of crime through investment
not only in law enforcement but also in education, health, and broader wel-
fare issues. And yet, in a period of immense political turbulence, the war
on poverty readily morphed into a war on the poor as such. The interac-
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tion between ethno-racial division and electoral politics saw the Civil Rights
Movements divide the Democratic Party at a time when Republicans suc-
cessfully effected a powerful political and electoral realignment surrounding
the nexus of racial anxiety and class division. Most notably, the purported
equivalence between the political mobilisation of African Americans on the
one hand and the “problem of street crime” on the other was an ideological
notion that also penetrated Democratic circles, to the point that any collec-
tive commitment to addressing the “root causes” of violence was replaced
with the language of “law and order”, espousing a punitive treatment of
racialised poverty.
The articulation, implementation, and enforcement of criminal justice
policy thus went from being more or less exclusively a matter for state and
local authorities to becoming a major preoccupation of the federal govern-
ment. This remarkable shift from protective to punitive interventionism was
legitimised through artificially inflated crime statistics – as local police agen-
cies were incentivised to report more crime in return for federally sponsored
infusions of money and equipment (Thompson, 2010: 727) – serving as fod-
der for heightened public anxiety surrounding crime and attendant “social
problems”. This simultaneously undermined the use of social and economic
programmes to reduce crime and poverty, as President Johnson’s “Great
Society” programmes were increasingly portrayed not only as unsuccessful
but as fundamentally flawed in their design and intent. In the process, the
Republican Party, in pursuing its so-called “southern strategy”, successfully
deployed a persistent motif in the nation’s cultural imaginary that associated
“the problem of crime” with (poor) Blacks, who in turn were linked to the
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“problem of welfare dependency”. The only ethically meaningful and polit-
ically potent solution to these interlinked “problems” was, according to this
line of argument, the introduction of harsh punishments for any disturbance
to “public order”.
The punitive political reorientation seen in both “wars” on poverty and
crime was further distilled in the “war on drugs”. The latter was only in
part a response to exogenous shocks to local drug environments5 and served
to escalate the criminalisation of racialised poverty in ways that transcended
party lines. Perhaps the most pronounced illustration of this was seen in Pres-
ident Clinton’s ratification in 1994 of a 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine – two virtually identical drugs that differed only
in that the former was consumed almost exclusively by African Americans in
areas of concentrated poverty, whereas the latter was viewed as an innocuous
ingredient of White (upper) middle-class leisure time (Frank, 2016).
2.4 The anatomy of American social policy
Penal expansion in the United States has been a central part of a broader
social policy repertoire with three principal components. First, the social
safety net for society’s most vulnerable is characterised by a consistent po-
litical emphasis on workfare over welfare, entailing the deployment of public
assistance as a means of work enforcement (Peck, 2001). The most inci-
5 The major exogenous shock to drug availability came not “from below” but “from
above” when, in late 1995, opioids like OxyContin were not only deregulated by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration but aggressively advertised and promoted through media
and physician marketing channels (see e.g. Hadland et al., 2019).
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sive sociological articulation of this phenomenon is furnished by Frances Fox
Piven and Richard Cloward, who construe periodically expanding and con-
tracting relief rolls as serving the twofold purpose of muting civil disorder
and enforcing low-wage work norms (Piven and Cloward, 1993). The authors
note how relief arrangements are augmented during times of social and polit-
ical turbulence, wrought by the endogenous dislocations of capitalism, only
to be curtailed during times of stability and continuity, and they chronicle
the countercyclical evolution of public assistance in the United States, from
rapid expansions under the Great Depression in the 1930s and the turmoil of
the 1960s Civil Rights era, to austere contractions during periods of relative
stability in the 1940s and 1950s, and then again in the 1990s.
The latest historical inflection of this welfare trajectory has been sub-
ject to extensive scrutiny and debate. Median monthly Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare payments to poor single moth-
ers went down from $221 in 1970 to $119 in 1995, measured in constant
dollars, which is equivalent to a net decline of over 50% in purchasing power.
Regional variation in this decline ranged from 48% in Michigan to 68% in
Texas. Maximum cash payment in the median state in 1994 equalled 38%
of the federal poverty line, and only 69% when combined with food stamps
and other welfare arrangements, thus designed to disincentivise “welfare de-
pendency” (Wacquant, 2009: 49–54). In 1996, coverage of poor American
households eligible to receive benefits slipped below the 50% threshold, at
which point the AFDC itself was repealed and replaced by Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (TANF) under the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA) of President Clinton’s Welfare Reform,
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which ended 61 years of poor families’ entitlement to federal welfare benefits
by downsizing social transfers and multiplying the bureaucratic obstacles to
meeting relevant eligibility criteria (Hays, 2003). Between 1970 and 1996, the
value of cash assistance benefits for poor families with children had already
fallen by more than 40% in real terms in the vast majority of U.S. states.
Since the introduction of TANF, they have tumbled by at least another 20%,
to the point where, as of July 2016, TANF benefits for a family of three with
no other cash income were below half of the official poverty line in every
state, and most states’ benefits were below 30% of the poverty line (Stanley
et al., 2016).
The PRWOA abolished lone mothers’ right to public assistance as stip-
ulated by the 1935 Social Security Act, curtailed support to a lifetime cap
of five years, and imposed the obligation for recipients of aid to work within
two years (at most). It devolved the administrative burden of assistance to
individual states of the Union and their counties, whilst incentivising poli-
cies designed to reduce the number of recipients through the imposition of
restrictive eligibility criteria and reduced support. Moreover, it instituted
block grants that pegged cash endowments to fixed annual amounts, prevent-
ing welfare from operating in a countercyclical fashion in times of recession
or crisis. Finally, it legally excludes “fringe” populations – most notably
former drug convicts, but also foreign residents, poor disabled children, or
unwed teen mothers who refuse to live with their parents (Wacquant, 2009:
91; Danziger, 2010). Public aid offices, under the aegis of health profession-
als without any medical training, were instructed upon its implementation
to set medical boundaries to the effect that thousands of disabled individ-
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uals were deemed “fit for work” and hence denied social assistance. This
was buttressed and amplified by long-winded, tedious, and disparaging ad-
ministrative procedures designed to discourage applications and disillusion
potential recipients, a strategy proven successful by that fact that, by 2014,
only 23 families received TANF benefits for every 100 poor families with chil-
dren, as compared to 68 for every 100 poor families in 1996 (Stanley et al.,
2016).6
Most of the social scientific literature on recent American welfare state
policy focuses on the transition from AFDC to TANF, without considering
the wider gamut of federal social policy programmes that notably include
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Supplemental Nutrition As-
sistance Program (SNAP). A sole focus on TANF is likely to divert attention
from the fact that the 1996 Welfare Reform epitomised not so much the dis-
mantling but the reconfiguration of the social wing of the state anchored in
a shift from a need-based to a work-based policy paradigm (Tach and Edin,
2017; see also Moffitt, 2015). The entrenchment of workfare is conveyed
by how, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, the average net replacement rate for low-wage workers receiving
6 The bureaucratic pressure exerted on American welfare recipients is conveyed by
Susan Hays’ ethnography of poor single mothers: “The first thing you see on entering the
Arbordale welfare office is a large red banner, 12 feet long, 2 feet high, reading, ‘HOW
MANY MONTHS DO YOU HAVE LEFT?’ Underneath that banner is a listing of jobs
available in the area – receptionist, night clerk, fast food server, cashier, waitress, data
entry personnel, beautician, forklift operator. In most cases, the hours, benefits, and pay
rates are not listed. The message is unmistakable: you must find a job, find it soon (before
your months run out), and accept whatever wages or hours you can get” (Hays, 2003: 32).
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unemployment insurance in the United States is 67% for a maximum duration
of six months or, in the case of nine states, only up to three months (Burt-
less, 2018). Typically, unemployment insurance is disbursed for 15 weeks at
a stagnating real average value of around $300 (in current dollars), whilst
coverage has shrunk from over 75% of wage earners following the 1935 Social
Security Act to less than 40% in 1995. At the same time, the termination of
the Comprehensive Education and Training Act, designed to reintegrate the
unemployed, eliminated almost half a million jobs for unskilled wage earners
in 1984, whilst overall federal spending on job training also dwindled after
1975 (Wacquant, 2009: 52–53). However, as evidenced by Figure 2.1, despite
the fact that classic welfare support has tumbled, the reach of federal gov-
ernment programmes has expanded in tandem with increased spending on
means-tested assistance measures (Congressional Budget Office, 2013), which
have largely targeted workers living just above the poverty line. The conse-
quence has been the emergence of a “middle-class” safety net (see Reeves and
Pulliam, 2018) that rests on the use of public policy as a vector of discipline,
deploying mandatory work assignments as a powerful institutional mecha-
nism by which precarious wage labour is generalised in the nether regions of
social space (Corcoran et al., 2000; Danziger et al., 2000; Collins and Mayer,
2010; see also Keith-Jennings and Chaudry, 2018; Krueger and Posner, 2018;
The Economist, 2018).
The second component of this policy repertoire is the punitive treatment
of those who fall between the cracks of the safety net. This punitive treatment
is largely gendered, with the male side of the emergent “precariat” being en-
meshed in the criminal justice system and the female side being subjected
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Figure 2.1: Share of Americans using government programmes. Source: replication of
Mettler (2018a) in The New York Times (Badger, 2018).
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not only to persistent workfarism but also to spatial reshuffling by means of
aggressive gentrification. Coupled with stagnating incomes and rising hous-
ing costs, eviction constitutes a consequential form of social punishment for
deprived female-headed households. It leads to the inability to secure decent
housing for their families, further downward mobility, and heightened risk
of homelessness (Desmond, 2012; 2016). However, the retrenchment of the
protective wing of the state is accompanied by the expansion of its punitive
wing (cf. Beckett and Western, 2001) not only for a fractured working class
but also for other “marginal” populations. Most notably, successive waves
of “deinstitutionalisation” during the 1960s and 1970s have led to the men-
tally ill having found shelter in jails after being thrown on the streets by
downsized hospitals and psychiatric institutions. The number of psychiatric
hospital patients nosedived by close to 90% between the mid-1950s and the
mid-1990s (from over half a million to less than 70,000), yet those same indi-
viduals seem to have reappeared in the country’s jails and prisons, typically
arraigned for public order infractions that reflect their mental impairment
and psychological suffering (Wacquant, 2009: 90). The estimated prevalence
of mental illness exceeds 60% in county jails and 50% in state prisons, and
is especially high amongst White inmates, whilst the prevalence of serious
chronic illnesses, such as major affective disorders or schizophrenia, is es-
timated to be roughly one-fifth of the total carceral population (National
Research Council, 2014: 204–205, Table 7-1).
The third component of the policy repertoire is the making of a generous
welfare system for the wealthy. As indicated by Figure 2.2, the American
welfare state has a dual structure. Insofar as social policy may be defined
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as “any government effort to deliver economic security to citizens through
the protection against income loss and the guarantee of a minimum standard
of living” (Faricy, 2016: 3), tax expenditures, a form of off-budget spending
executed through the tax code, emerge as a major mechanism whereby the
American state consistently provides support for society’s most privileged
(see also Massey, 2008: 180–185). In 2004 alone, $64 billion were made in
fiscal deductions for mortgage interest payments and real estate taxes (as
compared to $17 billion going to welfare payments to the poor, $25 billion
to food stamps, and $7.5 billion to child nutrition assistance), up to half of
which went to the top income ventile (Wacquant, 2009: 42). Although the
notion of “welfare” in the United States is most closely associated with Rea-
gan’s (in)famous invocation of a woman from Chicago’s Black Belt who “has
eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve Social Security cards and is collecting
veterans’ benefits on four nonexisting deceased husbands” (cited in Faricy,
2016: 11; see also Gilens, 1999), the private social system in the United
States is a generous welfare arrangement backed by the federal state, princi-
pally accruing substantial benefits to wealthy and typically White members
of the corporate community (Faricy, 2016: 11). This is evidenced by how, in
2015, close to 70% of all tax expenditures on pension benefits went to the top
income quintile, compared to only 0.6% to the bottom quintile (ibid : 13).
Tax expenditures are inscribed in the tax code for health care, education,
and old-age pensions (ibid : 108–113), with pension benefits alone equating
to $86 billion for the wealthiest, i.e. threefold the amount of the bottom
80% of the income distribution. As a share of total tax expenditures, over
half (51%) go to the highest income quintile, compared to 8% to the bottom
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Figure 2.2: The distribution of government benefits across the American income distribu-
tion. Source: Mettler (2018b).
quintile (ibid : 13). Tax expenditures contribute significantly to undoing tax
progressivity in that they reduce tax rates more substantially for individuals
and households who pay higher marginal rates. In short, the bicephalous
welfare system effectively serves to redistribute resources to the top of the
social order.
When viewed as a whole, the anatomy of social policy is a likely driver
of deepening inequality in the United States through a distinct form of in-
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stitutional imbrication that harnesses both “hands” of the state (Bourdieu,
2002) to practice disciplinary paternalism at the bottom of the class struc-
ture and protective maternalism at the top.7 Anchored in the politics of
federalism, there is regional variation in the kind of institutional imbrication
that is operant in a given city, county, or state. Such variation is historically
informed by deeply entrenched organisational cultures that shape the politi-
cal use of public and private institutions that, in turn, influence population
health outcomes (Kunitz, 2015). Such structural variation can help account
for the geographically patterned mortality burden across the United States,
as visualised in the Introduction (see Figures 1, 3, and 4), potentially with
even greater predictive power than a sole focus on economic deprivation or
decline would allow. This is conveyed by Stephen Kunitz’ comparative his-
torical analysis of two pairs of states with similar levels of per capita and
median household incomes but with contrasting institutional arrangements,
7 Therborn (2013) distinguishes between four mechanisms by which inequalities are
generated. Distanciation is construed as a systemic process whereby social distances
between “winners” and “losers” are spawned, fuelled by institutionalised structures of
reward and retribution, promotion and penalty, privilege and punishment. Exclusion refers
to the process by which selected social agents are hindered from fully partaking in social
life through obstructed access to symbolic and material goods, typically via discriminatory
expulsion or social “caging”. Hierarchisation designates the formal organisation of socially
defined relations of superiority and inferiority, manifest in intra-organisational rankings
and distinctions. And finally, exploitation entails a distinctly asymmetrical relation of
domination between two parties whereby one, through authority or coercion, extracts
(surplus) value from the other (ibid : 62, Table 4). Based on the above, all four – but
especially the first two – of these mechanisms appear to be deeply inscribed in the very
fabric of American social policy.
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namely North and South Dakota on the one hand, and Kentucky and West
Virginia on the other. Nested within the Border states, there is significantly
greater resource inequality (as measured by income and education), existen-
tial inequality (as measured by the status of Native Americans, to which the
enduring legacy of slavery can be added), and vital inequality (as measured
by levels of mortality) than in the Dakotas. Moreover, typical socioeconomic
variables are strongly associated with aggregate mortality trends in Kentucky
and West Virginia, but not so on the Northern Plains. What seems to ac-
count for these divergent patterns is, at least in part, “the propensity to use
both governmental and non-governmental institutions to address social con-
ditions [and community problems]” (ibid : 54; see pages 124–146), notably in
the form of mobilisation around civic conceptions of the public good.
It just so happens that both Border states have experienced sharp in-
creases in incarceration rates that continue today, even when the national
average has started to stagnate and decline under the press of overcrowded
facilities and tightening state budgets. In Kentucky, the prison admissions
rate has gone from around 100 per 100,000 working-age residents in 1980 to
just under 700 in 2016, whilst the jail incarceration rate has grown sixfold
from around 50 to approximately 300 per 100,000 (Kang-Brown et al., 2018:
31, Figure 9). In West Virginia, the overall prison incarceration rate has
roughly quintupled from around 70 to just under 400 inmates per 100,000
population between 1978 and 2014, and the jail incarceration rate has nearly
tripled to reach around 180 per 100,000 (Prison Policy Initiative, n.d.). To-
tal incarceration rates in the two states are at an astounding 869 and 690
inmates per 100,000 population, respectively. At the same time, nine of the
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top ten counties nationwide with the highest level and eight of the top ten
counties with the largest increase since 1980 in age-standardised mortality
rates from drug use disorders are located in either Kentucky or West Virginia
(Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2018). Conversely, six of the top ten counties with
the lowest drug-related mortality rates are located in the Dakotas, where
incarceration rates are far below the national average in North Dakota (at
560 per 100,000 population), although above average in South Dakota (855
per 100,000). However, five of the top ten counties with the smallest increase
in such deaths are located in New York, where the urban prison admissions
rate has dropped by 50% since the mid-1990s (Kang-Brown et al., 2018: 22,
Figure 5), placing the overall New York incarceration rate well below the na-
tional average (at 443 per 100,000 population). On this basis, as I will look
to empirically substantiate in Part II below, it is unlikely by chance that
Kentucky and West Virginia have borne the brunt of the ongoing overdose
epidemic, which has aggravated the already deep-seated mortality disadvan-
tage carried by their populations over many decades.
2.5 Conclusion
I have adumbrated a number of social, political, and economic forces that
generate unequal life chances. The hypothesised mechanisms by which these
produce vital inequality will be outlined in the next chapter. I have high-
lighted that capitalism produces endogenous dislocations that, in turn, act
upon some of the major social determinants of health and illness. Most
notably, in the wake of rapid industrial restructuring, the social wing of
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the state stems the tide of economic dislocation by deploying workfare as a
means of effecting the transition from manufacturing to service sector em-
ployment. Thus an emergent subproletariat is springboarded into precarious
wage work, whilst for those who fall through the cracks, punitive measures
are rolled out. The disciplinary aspect of this policy repertoire has been a
major force behind an increasingly dualised social structure, as illustrated by
the sharp rise in the number of households whose incomes are located below
the World Bank’s $2-a-day poverty line (Edin and Shaefer, 2015). Indeed, the
number of children in such poverty has more than doubled since the 1990s as
poor single mothers – the female counterpart to those who typically populate
the country’s jails and prisons – have experienced plummeting real incomes
(Tach and Edin, 2017: 544–545) and chronic economic insecurity (Collins
and Mayer, 2010). I have emphasised the important but oft-neglected role of
corporate power, anchored in and buttressed by state policy, in driving this





One of the main points that emerged from the previous chapter was that one
of the principal determinants of inequality appears to be not only economic
decline but political responses to economic decline. The literature on the
health effects of resource shocks associated with deindustrialisation (Hopper
et al., 1985; Hamilton et al., 1990; Wagner, 1991; Byrne, 1995; Aghion et
al., 2016), trade liberalisation (Pierce and Schott, 2016b; Barlow et al., 2017;
McNamara, 2017), or broader labour market conditions is vast (see Avendano
and Berkman [2014] for an overview). However, there are various possible
welfare state responses to such resource shocks (e.g. Iversen and Cusack,
2000) that can moderate or magnify deleterious impacts (Stuckler and Basu,
2013). A distinctive feature of American social policy is its punitive mode
of poverty regulation in the wake of economic decline, epitomised by high
rates of incarceration. In this chapter and the ones to follow, I will therefore
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construe the operations of the penal state as a window through which the
broader ramifications of punitive social policy can be grasped (see Nosrati
and Marmot, 2019). By detailing its corrosive impact on the most vulnerable
nether regions of social space, and thus on the “fundamental causes” of ill
health (Link and Phelan, 1995), I will briefly delineate the hypothesised
pathways and mechanisms through which penal expansion can shape vital
inequality, and how it contributes to the making of what Case and Deaton
(2017) call “cumulative disadvantage”.
3.2 Poverty, punishment, and poor health
The dynamics of (un)employment, social marginality, and incarceration are
mutually entangled (see e.g. Western et al., 2006; Western and Muller, 2013).
Amongst incarcerated men between the ages of 27 and 42, 57% earn less
than $22,500 per annum prior to incarceration. The median incarcerated
man has a pre-incarceration income that is less than half of that of the
median non-incarcerated man (Rabuy and Kopf, 2015). For African Ameri-
can ex-prisoners, employment duration decreases from 35 weeks per year to
21, hourly wages sink from $10.25 to $9.25, and consequently annual earn-
ings tumble by over 45% from an average of $13,000 before to $7,000 after
imprisonment. Controlling for drug use, but also age, education, work ex-
perience, industry, region of the country, public sector employment, union
status, marital status, school enrolment, urban residence, local unemploy-
ment, year, and education-by-year interactions, incarceration reduces annual
employment by 9.7% for European Americans, by 13.7% for Hispanics, and
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by 15.1% for African Americans. For hourly wages, the corresponding fig-
ures equal 16.3%, 25.7%, and 12.4%, whilst annual income is reduced by
35.9%, 32.2%, and 36.9%, respectively. Such results are also seen in employ-
ment prospects, in terms of wage growth and tenure, leading to substantial
negative aggregate effects on lifetime earnings (Western, 2006: 116, 119,
124–127). Former convicts experience overall unemployment rates of 27%,
which exceeds the total unemployment peak of the Great Recession in 1933
(Couloute and Kopf, 2018). Once released from prison, former inmates of
colour, notwithstanding their prior disadvantage in the labour market, see
their job application success rate drop by 65% (Pager, 2003: 958) and of-
ten slip out of the official labour force, which further contributes to hidden
joblessness that evades official statistics (Western, 2006: 87).
Whereas rates of homelessness are 21 per 10,000 population for the gen-
eral public, for those who have been incarcerated once, it is 141 per 10,000,
and for those with multiple encounters with the criminal justice system, the
number is 279. In other words, for those who have been incarcerated more
than once, homelessness rates are 13 times that of the general public. More-
over, according to data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, high rates
of recidivism, fostered by the active criminalisation of poverty (Thompson,
2010), imply that almost half of those released from prison are rearrested
within 1 year, over two-thirds within 3 years, and over 80% within 9 years,
thus creating a vicious cycle of punishment and poverty (Couloute, 2018).
Previous research has not only shown that former inmates experience
mortality rates close to thirteenfold that of the comparable populace – and
are especially vulnerable during the first two weeks post-release (Binswanger
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et al., 2007; Zlodre and Fazel, 2012) – but also that high incarceration rates
exert cascading effects across generations, local communities, and other net-
works of current or former incarcerated persons (for recent reviews, see Na-
tional Research Council, 2014: chapters 7–10; Massoglia and Pridemore,
2015; Wildeman and Wang, 2017). Put differently, the experience of incar-
ceration may be traumatic in and of itself, both for those who are incar-
cerated and for their families, friends, and broader social connections (see
Western, 2018). The incarceration of a family member has been shown to
impair the wellbeing of non-incarcerated partners and children (Pettit and
Western, 2004; Freudenberg et al., 2005; Wildeman, 2009; Wildeman and
Muller, 2012; Turney, 2014), notably due to declining household income, re-
duced parental investment, unstable social relationships, and psychosocial
stress (see also Arditti et al., 2003; Christian, 2005; Lopoo and Western,
2005; Comfort, 2007). Net of purely material factors, a mother’s risk of a
major depressive episode and her level of life dissatisfaction is heightened as
a result of her partner’s incarceration (Wildeman et al., 2012). Whilst mar-
riage is relatively uncommon in the carceral population (14% of European
Americans, 22% of Hispanics, and 11% of African Americans in prison are
married, respectively), fatherhood is not (figures for fatherhood equal 64%,
81%, and 70%, respectively). Thus between 1980 and 2000, the total number
of children with a father in prison increased sixfold to reach over 2 million at
the turn of the century, i.e. almost 3% of all children nationwide. Amongst
these, the cumulative risk of experiencing parental incarceration by age 14
amongst African American children born to high-school dropouts exceeds
50% (Wildeman, 2009).
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At the community level, the criminal justice system plays a pivotal role in
shaping the trajectories of neighbourhoods by removing prime age men from
their local communities, tearing families apart, and disrupting social net-
works (Western, 2006; Clear, 2007; Wacquant, 2009; Sampson and Loeffler,
2010; National Research Council, 2014; Western, 2018). When coupled with
socioeconomic relegation, the operations of the penal state constitute an
upstream determinant of “despair” whereby regular exposures to neighbour-
hood violence, unstable social and family relationships, and psychosocial
stress trigger destructive (health) behaviours (Clear, 2008; Merall et al.,
2010; Thompson, 2010; Drakulich et al., 2012; Turney, 2014). Symboli-
cally, the existence of former prisoners, their friends, and their family is
stained by the stigma that incarceration stamps on both their past and their
future. In crushing combination with deteriorating employment parameters
and deepened material hardship, this consolidates what Goffman (1968) dubs
a “spoiled identity” – which in itself is a social determinant of health (Phelan
et al., 2014).
Indeed, one of the simplest yet most consequential effects of incarcera-
tion is the increasing invisibility of the poor from the public sphere (Patillo
et al., 2004; Western 2006; National Research Council, 2014). Physically,
the victims of punitive social policy are confined to the spatial container
that is a prison or to the perimeter of highly segregated neighbourhoods (cf.
Massey and Denton, 1994). Socioeconomically, their lives are corralled in
the bottom layers of social space. Carceral populations are entirely omitted
from national surveys deployed to track economic trends (Western 2006: 87),
thus shrouding a persistent form of exclusionary closure. For young African
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American men at century’s dawn, unemployment jumps from one-fourth to
one-third once incarceration is taken into account (ibid : 90). For prime age
men of colour without a high school diploma, the same figure swells from 41%
to 65%, meaning two out of three Black male dropouts are absent from the
labour market, whereof nearly half is due to incarceration (ibid : 91). Cur-
rent and former convicts become politically disenfranchised, meaning they
are not only “locked up” but also “locked out” (Manza and Uggen, 2008),
with potentially profound consequences for vital inequality (see Beckfield,
2018: 35–39, 84–88). They typically lose eligibility for the meagre social
assistance available to the most vulnerable and the stigma they carry perco-
lates to the very core of their existence, which is symbolically abrogated and
annulled.
Just like the gradual decomposition of the American working class un-
der the press of deindustrialisation has evoked metaphors of collective defeat
and subjugation (see Milkman, 1997; Cowie and Heathcott, 2003; High and
Lewis, 2007; Doussard et al., 2009), so do these interlocking social processes,
when viewed in tandem, ferment the sense of subjective demoralisation that
permeates the bottom rungs of the socioeconomic landscape. They create and
compound diverse modalities of “social sundering” (Therborn, 2013: 22–28),
dissolve the prospect of any collective cohesion or mobilisation, and precip-
itate a form of social death – one that, as we shall see in the forthcoming
chapters, is accompanied by physical deaths. In short, (hyper)incarceration
means more than just penal confinement. It is a powerful institutional force
that mediates and modifies, amplifies and aggravates the nexus of resource
inequality, existential inequality, and vital inequality. Based on existing evi-
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Figure 3.1: Hypothesised pathway(s) by which high incarceration rates are associated with
mortality risk: both jail and prison incarceration can lead to both network disruption and
stigma, with cascading community effects; these include crime and violence, as well as both
individual and collective downward mobility; these factors coalesce into a self-reinforcing
system conducive to psychosocial stress (or “despair”).
dence on how punitive social policy can lead to vital inequality, a proposed
set of pathways is visualised in Figure 3.1. These pathways are hypothesised
to be operant over and above the endogenous health profiles of the incarcer-
ated (see National Research Council, 2014: 204–213). As I will discuss in
Part II, and in light of the spillover effects described above, punitive social
policy likely has the power to shape aggregate patterns of vital inequality




One of the critiques directed at the analytic framework offered by the po-
litical economy of public health is the question of its biological plausibility
(Krieger, 2011: 167–191, 213–234). By virtue of primarily lending its focus
to distal causes of health and illness that seem far removed from the lived
experience of individual organisms, the framework has been described as
“biologically opaque, affording little insight into the biophysical phenomena
relevant to translating societal conditions into population patterns of health,
disease and well-being” (ibid : 213). Thus far, I have briefly described the
cascading causal chains whereby upstream political and economic factors
influence health through a number of meso-level mediators, especially group-
level mechanisms of psychosocial distress that trigger deleterious health be-
haviours or in themselves heighten mortality risk. There is, however, an
emerging field of human social genomics (see Cole, 2009; Slavich and Cole,
2013; Cole, 2014) that may elucidate how both material and symbolic com-
ponents of our social habitat shape human gene expression in ways that
profoundly affect a range of complex phenotypes and disease susceptibility
(for a critical discussion, see Shostak and Beckfield, 2015). Although not pur-
sued further in the coming chapters, I offer a brief sketch of these scientific
developments that offer promising avenues for future research on embodied
inequality (cf. Wolfe et al., 2012).
Gene expression is regulated by intracellular proteins (transcription fac-
tors) that activate genes in the form of RNA in response to a wide variety of
endogenous and exogenous signals. Extracellular signals, such as stress hor-
mones (e.g. adrenaline or cortisol) secreted into the bloodstream in response
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to social adversity (say, sudden job loss or the imprisonment of a family
member), can elicit changes in genome-wide transcriptional dynamics by up-
regulating entire gene profiles whilst down-regulating others. Genes that are
particularly sensitive to social regulation have been observed in the immune
system, where a skewing of the basal transcriptome in leukocytes (white
blood cells) has been linked to enhanced production of pro-inflammatory
cytokines coupled with silenced anti-viral immune responses in contexts of
social isolation (e.g. Cole et al., 2007), acute and chronic stress (e.g. Powell et
al., 2013; Murphy et al., 2015), childhood adversity (e.g. Miller et al., 2009),
socioeconomic disadvantage (e.g. Chen et al., 2009), or low relative status
(e.g. Tung et al., 2012; Snyder-Mackler et al., 2016) – all of which are at
work in the intertwined social processes described above. Up-regulated pro-
inflammatory immune response genes increase susceptibility to conditions
such as cardiovascular disease and cancer, whilst down-regulated anti-viral
immune response genes render humans vulnerable to viral infections.
Combined with prolonged exposure to (socially and spatially) concen-
trated hardship, this so-called “conserved transcriptional response to adver-
sity” amplifies the cumulative biological burden known as allostatic (over)load
(see Seeman et al., 2001) whereby disruptions in the lived experience of social
agents are deposited in the human body in the form of neuroendocrine traits
that govern core pathogenic parameters. Amongst the manifold molecular
pathways involved in such “social signal transduction” (see Slavich and Cole,
2013; Slavich and Irwin 2014), epigenetic processes, notably chemical modi-
fications of histone proteins, have been shown to influence the regulation of
gene expression in ways that further reflect the transcriptional embedding
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of social experiences (e.g. Champagne, 2010; Meaney and Ferguson-Smith,
2010). For instance, socially differentiated patterns of DNA methylation (the
addition of a methyl group to DNA) within the pathways described above
have been shown to contribute to the up- or down-regulation of immune
response genes (e.g. Liu et al., 2008).
These novel insights, located at the interface of the social and biologi-
cal sciences, form a nascent field of enquiry filled with promises (Kubzansky
et al., 2014; Moore, 2015) but also with deep uncertainties (Miller, 2010).
However, they suggest emergent scientific opportunities to empirically ex-
pand and conceptually unify the study of embodied inequality in a way that
entails the joint inclusion of the social and the biological, the symbolic and
the material in our analytic purview. They subtly point to what Claude Lévi-
Strauss, in his anthropology of symbolic efficacy, famously describes as “a
certain ‘inductive property’, by which formally homologous structures, built
out of different materials at different levels of life – organic processes, uncon-
scious mind, rational thought – are related to one another” (Lévi-Strauss,
1974: 201). This very “inductive property”, onto which social genomics is
breathing fresh understanding, is what enables embodied social life through
“a biological [. . . ] reading of social properties and a social reading of [bio-
logical] properties, thus leading to a social re-use of biological properties and
a biological re-use of social properties” (Bourdieu, 1992: 79).
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have reviewed existing evidence on the role of incarceration
in shaping the interface between resource inequality, existential inequality,
and vital inequality. Punitive political responses to economic decline act
on the social determinants of health, chief amongst them unemployment,
poverty, and stigma, and generate vicious spirals of relegation and despair.
Moreover, in light of recent scholarship, they constitute a locus of organic
tension, a veritable “socio-biological phenomenon”, in the sense of Marcel
Mauss (2013). Politics and policies must therefore be conceptualised as part
of the epigenome, i.e. as sites of lived experience that actively shape human






Jails, prisons, and the
American overdose epidemic
4.1 Introduction
America is in the grip of an overdose epidemic, with age-standardised mor-
tality rates from drug use disorders growing more than 600% since 1980 and
currently being the second leading cause of death nationwide for those be-
tween the ages of 15 and 49. Overdose deaths have increased in every single
county, but at vastly different rates ranging from 8% to over 8000% (Dwyer-
Lindgren et al., 2018). In this chapter, I empirically test the hypothesis
according to which incarceration – in the form of jail and prison admissions
rates – can help explain the rise of such mortality rates and the spatial vari-
ation in their prevalence, net of other confounding factors such as median
household income, crime, or local opioid prescription rates. Using hitherto
unavailable panel data, I examine these associations for the first time, looking
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both at variation within and between counties, finding that jail and prison
incarceration rates are major predictors of drug-related mortality.
4.2 Empirical strategy
Data
My outcome variable is the annual age-standardised mortality rate from drug
use disorders per 100,000 population for 2,640 U.S. counties between 1980 and
2014. These recently released public-use data from the Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation are generated from death registration data collected
by the National Vital Statistics System using the Global Burden of Diseases,
Injuries, and Risk Factors Study cause list. This cause list is composed of
hundreds of mutually exclusive causes of death that are matched onto the
International Classification of Diseases, ninth and tenth revisions (ICD-9,
ICD-10; for details, see eTable3 in the Supplement of Dwyer-Lindgren et al.,
2018). The novelty of this data set is that it uses machine learning algo-
rithms and small-area estimation methods to rectify potentially misleading
spatial and temporal patterns in mortality trends across geographical units
due to poor-quality death codes in previous data collections. It also offers
age-standardised mortality estimates by cause of death for all U.S. counties
since 1980. This chapter focuses on age-standardised mortality rates from
drug use disorders (ICD-9 codes 292–292.9, 304.0–304.83, 305, 305.1–305.93,
760.7–760.79, E850–E850.29; ICD-10 codes F11–F16.99, F18–F19.99, P04.4–
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P04.49, P96.1, R78.1–R78.5).1
I use hitherto unavailable county-level jail and prison incarceration data
from the Vera Institute of Justice (Kang-Brown, 2015; Subramanian et al.,
2015; Hinds et al., 2018; Kang-Brown et al., 2018). Jail incarceration data,
collected in the Census of Jails and the Annual Survey of Jails by the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, are compiled to generate annual county-level rates
per 100,000 residents aged 15–64 by the Vera Institute of Justice. Prison
data from state corrections sources and the National Corrections Reporting
Program by the Bureau of Justice Statistics are also compiled into annual
county-level rates per 100,000 residents aged 15–64, although the earliest
available data come from 1983 (Hinds et al., 2018). Prison data at the state
level are collected in the annual National Prisoner Statistics survey by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Six states – Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont – are excluded from the analysis be-
cause they do not have local jail systems. In these states, the prison system
operates the pre-trial detention and short incarceration sentences managed
by county jails in other states. Thus, prison admissions data in those states
are more comparable in magnitude to jail admissions data elsewhere, and
the Bureau of Justice Statistics has not collected true prison admissions data
in those states consistently. Due to certain discrepancies between different
data sources in measuring county boundaries and accounting for changes to
counties over time, the state of Virginia and a handful of counties from other
1 It is worth noting that the composition of drug-related deaths has remained rela-
tively stable over the study period, with the exception of mortality rates from prescription
opioids, which have jumped up around the turn of the century to the point of overtaking
heroin and cocaine as the leading cause of overdose deaths.
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states are also excluded from the final analysis. Finally, salient outliers, po-
tentially caused by measurement error in the Vera data set, especially in the
early years of the panel (before 1983), are removed.
My control variables are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics, and some of them are described in eTable2
of Dwyer-Lindgren and colleagues (2017). They include the following:
• Median county household income, adjusted for inflation.
• Fraction of the county population aged 25 or older who have completed
high school.
• Fraction of the county population who are African American.
• Fraction of the county population who are Hispanics.
• Fraction of the county population who are of some other non-White
ethnicity.
• Violent crime rate per 100,000 county population.
• For the years 2006-2014, I also use county-level retail opioid prescription
rates dispensed per 100 persons as an additional control variable. These
data are publicly available from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.
Of these control variables, the first five are based on various census estimates
and are thus not available on an annual basis. To fill missing cells in the
panel, linear interpolation is used to generate values between observations
(Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2017).
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Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.1. The reader will note
substantial inequalities in drug-related mortality, which on average is 4.9
deaths per 100,000 county residents, but with a standard deviation of 4.7.
The lowest rate of drug deaths in any county-year is 0.3, whilst the highest
rate lies at no less than 60.8 per 100,000 population. These inequalities, and
their evolution over time, are visualised in Figure 4.1. Similarly, the jail and
prison admissions rates are subject to substantial variation, ranging from
around 20 to over 18,000 jail inmates per 100,000 and from 6 to over 730
prison inmates per 100,000 county residents. Comparable variation is also
seen in median household income, the ethno-racial composition of counties,
violent crime rates, and opioid prescription rates. A Spearman correlation
matrix is displayed in Table 4.2, which shows relatively weak but expected
correlations – for instance that median household income is negatively cor-
related with drug-related mortality and both jail and prison incarceration
rates. However, these simple unadjusted correlations remain difficult to in-
terpret and largely uninformative in the absence of a statistical approach
that explicitly models how these variables relate to each other.
Methods
For all statistical models in this thesis, I adopt King’s (1998) generalised
model notation whereby
Y ∼ f(y | θ, α),
θ = g(X, β), (1)
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Drug-related mortality rate 69,562 4.9 4.7 0.3 60.8
Jail admissions rate 67,172 7,018 3,822 20.2 18,445
Prison admissions rate 66,910 254.6 160.3 6.0 732.1
Median household income ($) 69,562 46,841 11,781 17,582 125,704
Fraction high school graduates 69,562 0.8 0.1 0.3 1.0
Fraction African Americans 69,562 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9
Fraction Hispanics 69,562 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0
Fraction other ethnicity 69,562 0.02 0.05 0.0 0.9
Violent crime rate 61,367 284.8 265.3 0.0 3,894
Opioid prescription rate 20,049 90.7 45.7 0.0 437.2
Notes: Rates are per 100,000 county residents; the mortality rate from drug use disorders


























































































































































































































































































where the first line designates the stochastic component and the second line
designates the systematic component of the model for some random outcome
variable Y (with realisation y), distributed according to some probability
density defined by f(·). θ is the systematic feature of the density that varies
with each observation, whilst α is usually a constant ancillary parameter. g(·)
designates the functional form, and X and β are the covariates and effect
parameters, respectively. This flexible notation allows for a wide variety of
model specifications that are adaptable to different data sets and can be
recalibrated to capture different quantities of interest. In this chapter, our
primary quantity of interest will be the set of parameters that determine the
expected value of the county-level age-standardised mortality rate from drug
use disorders between 1980 and 2014. Using the above notation, this can be
written as follows:
Y ∼ fN(yit | µit, σ2),
µit = E(Y | X) = Xβ. (2)
Here the random outcome variable Y (with realisation yit) is the mortality
rate from drug use disorders, assumed to be distributed according the Nor-
mal probability density defined by fN , conditional on a set of parameters;
µit is the expected value (E) of Y for county i at time t given a matrix of
covariates, X, containing key predictors such as incarceration rates and eco-
nomic decline, but also county and time fixed effects; β is the vector of effect
parameters corresponding to each covariate; and σ2 is the variance.
To examine the relationship between incarceration and deaths from drug
use disorders, I deploy a number of different methodological strategies. First,
I estimate a relatively conservative fixed effects panel regression. This model
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identifies exclusively from within-county variation by “de-meaning” through
entities over time. This has the virtue of controlling for any potential time-
invariant confounders, even if these confounders are unobserved (or even
unobservable). A major downside of this approach is that much, if not most,
of the variation in mortality rates lies between rather than within counties,
but this variation is entirely ignored by the fixed effects model. For this rea-
son, but also to assess model dependence, I run a multilevel random effects
“within-between” model (see Bell and Jones, 2015; de Leeuw and Meijer,
2008), which explicitly partitions the within- and between-county variance
to reproduce the fixed effects estimates together with estimates from a “be-
tween” model. This is done by incorporating two versions of each covariate X
into the model. The first, which will produce the equivalent of a fixed effects
estimate, is the “de-meaned” version of X (Xit−X̄i). The second, which will
lead to a “between” estimate, is simply the group (county) mean (X̄i). The
multilevel approach also allows for the intercept term to vary across counties,
and thus models rather than suppresses time-invariant county fixed effects.
Any statistical model will suffer from (at least) two sources of uncertainty
(see King et al., 2000). First, there is estimation uncertainty, which stems
from the lack of perfect knowledge of the parameter θ in Equation 1. This
lack of knowledge derives from not having an infinite number of observations
from which the exact, “true” value of θ can be calculated. Consequently,
estimation uncertainty will be reduced as the sample size increases (N →∞).
This form of uncertainty is typically acknowledged in empirical research in the
form of standard errors or confidence intervals associated with a parameter
estimate, θ̂, but is often neglected when computing additional quantities
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of interest, such as predicted values, that are derived from such parameter
estimates. A second form of uncertainty, known as fundamental uncertainty,
is also rarely taken into account by researchers. Fundamental uncertainty
designates intrinsic variability in the world – which exists regardless of our
knowledge of θ – and is represented by the stochastic component in Equation
1. In other words, even if the researcher knows the exact data generating
process, she will not be able to perfectly predict any and every future data
point. This is simply due to the fact that the data generating process is
subject to stochastic variability, albeit within the confines of some underlying
probability distribution.
In order to better account for these forms of uncertainty, I follow two
principal analytic steps. Before conducting any analysis, I deploy matching
as a non-parametric form of pre-processing the data (Ho et al., 2007; Iacus
et al., 2018). The goal of matching is to reduce inefficiency, bias, and model
dependence, for instance in the form of uncertainty related to the functional
form g(·) in Equation 1. It is a non-model-based approach to preparing the
data for parametric analysis with a view to mimicking experimental research
designs. In non-technical terms, matching seeks to select units of analysis
(counties) that are similar if not identical to one another in all respects except
for one: whether or not they are exposed to a key variable of interest. In the
present case, the quantity of interest is the effect of high rates of incarceration
on drug-related mortality, over and above the endogenous associations be-
tween incarceration and factors like income, education, or crime. Applying a
matching algorithm will help “match” counties that share key characteristics,
with the exception that some have high incarceration rates and others have
68
low incarceration rates. This will facilitate a more precise account of the link
between penal expansion and drug-related deaths. In more technical terms,
let Yi designate the outcome variable of interest (drug-related mortality), let
Ti ∈ [0, 1] designate a dichotomous “treatment” variable (low versus high
incarceration rates), and let Xi designate a series of pre-treatment covariates
(income, education, crime, drug environment etc.). The “treatment effect”
(TE) on a treated unit i is TEi = Yi(Ti = 1) − Yi(Ti = 0). However, the
last term of this equation, Yi(Ti = 0), is an unobserved counterfactual. One
can estimate this quantity with Yj from control units (indexed by j) that
are matched on relevant covariates (i.e. Xi ≈ Xj) such that the estimated
counterfactual quantity, Ŷi(Ti = 0), is equal to Yj(Tj = 0). Unmatched units
are pruned from the data set to improve empirical covariate balance between
treatment and control groups in the sample, and the parametric model is
applied to the pruned rather than to the raw data. As a result, the func-
tional form of the parametric specification is subject to less arbitrary model
dependence.
In the analysis below, I employ what is known as coarsened exact match-
ing. This form of matching proceeds as follows. For lack of being able to
match on exact values of continuous covariates, this algorithm temporarily
“coarsens” the covariates X into sub-categories (e.g. quartiles). It then ap-
plies exact matching on the coarsened X, c(X), before sorting observations
into strata, each with unique values of c(X). Any stratum with zero treated
or control units is pruned from the data set. The algorithm then passes the
original (uncoarsened) units – except for the pruned ones – on to the matched
data set that is used in the parametric analysis. This particular approach to
69
matching possesses a number of desirable statistical properties that are not
present in other matching methods and has been shown to produce robust
results with good covariate balance (for details, see Iacus et al., 2012).
After extracting a pruned data set from the matching procedure, I adopt
a simulation-based approach to presenting key quantities of interest, as pro-
posed by Gary King and colleagues (King et al., 2000). Simulation can be
used to obtain useful information about a chosen probability distribution by
drawing random numbers from it. In looking to account for the two main
types of uncertainty outlined above, it is possible to treat any model pa-
rameter estimates as features of their underlying sampling distribution. In
fact, by the central limit theorem, the set of all model parameter estimates,
represented by the stacked column vector γ̂ = {β̂, σ̂2}, follows a multivariate
normal distribution with mean equal to the model estimates and variance
equal to the model variance-covariance matrix, V̂ (γ̂). More formally, the
distribution from which a simulated parameter value, γ̃, can be drawn is
represented as follows:
γ̃ ∼ fN(γ̂, V̂ [γ̂]). (3)
To obtain expected values of Y (drug-related mortality) for counties with
different values of the “treatment”, T (incarceration), I do the following (for
further details, see King et al., 2000):
1. I estimate a “between” model to further isolate between-county in-
equality, regressing Y on T . This is similar to the model displayed in
Equation 2, except that observations are averaged over time for each
county i (thus suppressing the time index) and that the dichotomous
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treatment indicator T replaces the matrix of covariates X:2
Y ∼ fN(yi | µi, σ2),
µi = E(Y | T ) = Tβ. (4)
2. I simulate from the sampling distribution of the parameter estimates
to incorporate estimation uncertainty by drawing M random numbers
from the multivariate normal distribution, as specified in Equation 3.
3. For each simulated parameter value, I calculate the systematic compo-
nent of the model in Equation 4, µ̃ = T β̃.
4. For each simulated systematic component, I draw another m separate
random draws of the outcome variable, ỹk (k = 1, . . . ,m), from the
stochastic model component (fN) in Equation 4 to incorporate funda-
mental uncertainty.
5. For each of the M sets of m simulated values, I average over the funda-
mental uncertainty by computing the mean of the m simulations, thus




2 Y is regressed on T only since covariate balance is obtained through matching.
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These expected values are used to visualise the uncertainty surrounding the
model parameters and to compare the distributions of E(Y | T = 0) and
E(Y | T = 1). First, the model is run with a continuous predictor, com-
paring counties with incarceration rates at one standard deviation below
the global mean (T = 0) to those one standard deviation above the global
mean (T = 1). The above steps are done for T = 0 and for T = 1 sep-
arately before differences in the expected values of Y are examined. As a
sensitivity measure, I modify the “treatment” to be defined for a county
above the 60th incarceration percentile. The number of simulations is set to
M = m = 100, 000. All statistical analyses are conducted in R, version 3.5.1
(R Core Team, 2018), using the software packages dplyr (Wickham et al.,
2018), ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016), plm (Croissant and Millo, 2008), MatchIt
(Ho et al., 2011), and Zelig (Imai et al., 2008; Choirat et al., 2018).
4.3 Findings
Figure 4.1 shows the mortality rate from drug use disorders across coun-
ties over time. There is not only a rise in such mortality rates, accelerating
from the mid-1990s onwards, but also increasing between-county inequal-
ity over time. Figure 4.2 confirms a social gradient in drug-related deaths,
yet highlights the existence of substantial heterogeneity across counties, no-
tably at the bottom of the income distribution. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show
that also local admissions rates to jails and prisons are unequal across the
income spectrum. When viewed in tandem with Figures 4.5 and 4.6, this in-
dicates that penal expansion may play a role in driving heightened substance
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abuse-related mortality risk in the most deprived counties and, based on the
evidence reviewed in the previous chapters, in the most deprived neighbour-
hoods within counties. The following analysis seeks to parametrically model
this hypothesis.
Table 4.3 shows results from the fixed effects regression. In this model, all
predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean
and dividing by one standard deviation. Moreover, the outcome variable is
the natural logarithm of the age-standardised mortality rate from drug-use
disorders, thus rendering coefficients interpretable as the percentage change
in the mortality rate associated with a one standard deviation increase in each
predictor – or in econometric terms, the semi-elasticity of Y with respect to
X. The presented standard errors are estimated using a robust covariance
matrix of parameters for panel models according to the Arellano version of
the White method, which allows a fully general structure with respect to
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Arellano, 1987).3 The results sug-
gest that both jail and prison incarceration rates are associated with elevated
mortality rates from drug use disorders, net of the aforementioned control
variables. A one standard deviation increase in the rate of jail admissions
is associated with a 1.5% increase in drug-related deaths (95% confidence
interval [CI]: [1.0, 2.0]; P < 0.001). The corresponding figure for prison ad-
missions rates is 2.6% (95% CI: [2.1, 3.1]; P < 0.001). These associations
hold over and above the effect of declining median household income, which is
associated with a 12.8% rise in drug-related mortality (95% CI: [11.0, 14.6];
3 For all results presented in this thesis, the precision of the parameter estimates is
robust to the choice of standard error estimator.
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Figure 4.1: Rise of age-standardised mortality rates from drug use disorders, 1980–2014.
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Figure 4.2: Bivariate association between median household income and age-standardised
mortality rates from drug use disorders (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 4.3: Bivariate association between median household income and jail admissions
rate (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 4.4: Bivariate association between median household income and prison admissions
rate (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 4.5: Bivariate association between jail admissions rate and age-standardised mor-
tality rates from drug use disorders (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 4.6: Bivariate association between prison admissions rate and age-standardised
mortality rates from drug use disorders (1980–2014 average).
79
P < 0.001). Amongst the other regressors, violent crime is, as expected,
associated with an elevated death rate from drug use disorders (β = 1.0%;
95% CI: [0.3, 1.6]; P < 0.01). The remaining coefficients must be interpreted
with great caution, given that within-county variation in the fraction of high
school graduates or ethno-racial composition is typically small and is nearly
time-invariant. These predictors will be easier to interpret when analysing
between-county variation, to which I proceed below. The fixed effects model
explains nearly all the within-county variation (R2 = 97.5%), although also
this figure must be interpreted with caution given, once again, that a sub-
stantial proportion of variation in the outcome variable lies between rather
than within counties. Nonetheless, these findings suggest a robust associa-
tion between penal expansion and the overdose epidemic, notably insofar as
high rates of incarceration may compound the deleterious health effects of
regional economic decline.
I also find that the results are robust to controlling for all-cause mortality
rates, suggesting that the findings do not merely reflect the endogenous health
profile of counties. Moreover, I run a conventional one-level random effects
model (not displayed), which “pools” within- and between-county variation.
This model produces virtually identical substantive results. Once again,
incarceration rates are associated with higher mortality rates from drug use
disorders (βjail = 1.8%; 95% CI: [1.3, 2.3]; P < 0.001; βprison = 2.9%; 95% CI:
[2.4, 3.4]; P < 0.001). As in the fixed effects regression, the other covariates
– with the exception of reduced median household income (β = 13.1%; 95%
CI: [11.4, 14.9]; P < 0.001) and violent crime (β = 1.5%; 95% CI: [0.9, 2.2];
P < 0.001) – produce coefficients that are difficult to interpret, but also here
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a high proportion of variation in drug-related mortality is captured (R2 =
97.3%). A second type of random effects model, which explicitly partitions
the total variation into variation within and variation between counties, will
help shed further light on the matter below.
Next, I fit a multilevel random effects “within-between” model in order
to simultaneously inspect variation within and variation between counties.
Because this model more than doubles the number of estimated parameters
compared to the fixed effects approach, I add and remove control variables
one by one to avoid over-specification. However, in all models, I retain the
year dummies to adjust for time fixed effects. A baseline model without
any controls is displayed in Table 4.4. The model estimates that the within-
county association between a one-standard deviation increase in jail admis-
sions rates and drug-related mortality is equal to 2.4% (95% CI: [2.2, 2.6];
P < 0.001), whereas the between-county association is equal to 9.1% (95%
CI: [7.3, 11.0]; P < 0.001). Corresponding figures for prison admissions rates
are 3.8% (95% CI: [3.6, 4.0]; P < 0.001) and 11.3% (95% CI: [9.5, 13.2];
P < 0.001). This discrepancy between the two types of estimates pertains
to differences in the source of variation. To quantify the amount of varia-
tion within and between counties, I calculate the so-called variance partition
coefficient (VPC) from a “null” model, which simply estimates a random
intercept without any regressors. This is obtained by dividing the intercept
variance by the total variance (intercept variance plus residual variance) from
the “null” model. The VPC is equal to 0.245, suggesting that no less than
a quarter of the total variation lies between rather than within counties.
This confirms the utility of the “within-between” specification. Comparing
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Table 4.3: Fixed effects panel regression model of drug-related mortality rates
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Jail admissions rate 1.5% 0.3 < 0.001
Prison admissions rate 2.6% 0.2 < 0.001
Household income decline 12.8% 0.9 < 0.001
Fraction high school graduates 5.7% 1.0 < 0.001
Fraction African Americans -6.6% 2.8 0.02
Fraction Hispanics -24.9% 2.0 < 0.001
Fraction other ethnicity -14.9% 2.8 < 0.001
Violent crime rate 1.0% 0.3 0.004
Notes: The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the age-standardised county mor-
tality rate from drug use disorders; the main predictors are the county jail admissions
rate and the county prison admissions rate per 100,000 population; the model controls
for decline in median county household income, the county fraction of high school grad-
uates, African Americans, Hispanics, or other non-White ethnicity, the county violent
crime rate, and for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies (not displayed); ro-
bust panel-corrected standard errors are presented in the second column; all predictors are
standardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard
deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the percentage change in the drug-related mortal-
ity rate associated with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 57, 732.
R2 = 97.5%.
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Table 4.4: Baseline multilevel random effects “within-between” panel regression
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Jail admissions rate
Within 2.4% 0.1 < 0.001
Between 9.1% 0.9 < 0.001
Prison admissions rate
Within 3.8% 0.1 < 0.001
Between 11.3% 0.9 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the age-standardised county mor-
tality rate from drug use disorders; the main predictors are the county jail admissions rate
and the county prison admissions rate per 100,000 population; the model only controls
for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies (not displayed); all predictors are
standardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard
deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the percentage change in the drug-related mortality
rate associated with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 64, 814.
the baseline model to the “null” model reveals that the addition of both
incarceration predictors reduces the intercept (between-county) variance by
almost 20% and the residual (within-county) variance by 97%.
Figure 4.7 visualises the parameter estimates and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals of each of the control models. Each panel shows the
coefficients for jail and prison admissions rates, adjusted for the control vari-
able whose label appears on the right hand side (as well as for aggregate time
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trends). For instance, the first panel (from the top) displays the association
between incarceration and age-standardised mortality rates from drug use
disorders, net of the effect of reduced median household income at the county
level. The second panel does the same for the county fraction of high school
graduates, and so on. The overall distribution of coefficients confirms that
the “within” estimator may produce extreme results,4 notably in the case
of variables that are mostly time-invariant within counties, whereas the “be-
tween” estimates lend themselves to easier interpretation. Thus, as expected,
counties with a higher fraction of high school graduates have lower rates of
drug-related mortality. Similarly, the coefficients for the ethno-racial compo-
sition of counties are more meaningful when looking at differences between
rather than changes within counties. The association between a concentra-
tion of African American residents and death rates from drug use disorders
is reduced (but still negative), for Hispanics it is rendered statistically in-
significant, and for other ethnic minorities, it reverses sign.5
Figure 4.8 reproduces the same figure but without the “within” coefficients
4 The reason that the “within” estimates produced here differ from those of the fixed
effects model is that, as mentioned, the multilevel approach also models a random intercept
(which the fixed effects approach suppresses). A one-level random effects “within-between”
model would generate “within” estimates that are identical to that of the fixed effects
approach (see Bell and Jones, 2015).
5 It is worth noting that these coefficients cannot be interpreted as to whether belonging
to a given ethnic minority entails a mortality (dis)advantage at the level of the individual.
The variables in question are simply measuring the aggregate ethno-racial composition
of counties, which provides limited information about the racialised patterning of vital
inequality.
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Figure 4.7: Coefficient plot of multilevel “within-between” random effects models. The
outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the age-standardised county mortality rate from
drug use disorders; the main predictors are the county jail and prison admissions rates
per 100,000 population, adjusted for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies;
control variables are added and removed one by one; the figure shows parameter estimates
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals; all predictors are standardised by calculating
deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are
interpreted as the percentage change in the drug-related mortality rate associated with a
one standard deviation increase in each predictor.
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of the latter two groups, which may be considered unreliable outliers. This
figure allows for more careful inspection of the main coefficients of interest
and the degree of uncertainty associated with them by zooming in on a subset
of the coefficient plot. The reader will note that in all models, jail and prison
incarceration rates are positively associated with drug-related deaths. The
“within” estimates are remarkably similar across all specifications, whereas
the “between” estimates are somewhat more variable. However, the latter
tend to be larger in size than the former, as is to be expected – with a few
notable exceptions, such as median household income. Overall, the “within-
between” approach sheds additional light on the association between penal
expansion and the American overdose epidemic. It confirms the substantive
findings of the relatively conservative fixed effects approach, but highlights
the importance of also taking between-county variation into account. Conse-
quently, I proceed to isolating and further probing between-county inequali-
ties in drug-related mortality rates using the matching and simulation-based
approaches described above.
The matching algorithm results in a pruned data set composed ofN = 963
counties. Counties are matched on the following time-averaged (1980–2014)
variables: median household income, the fraction of high school graduates,
African Americans, Hispanics, or other non-White ethnicity, the violent crime
rate, and the opioid prescription rate (2006–2014). The diagnostics reveal a
high degree of balance improvement since the empirical covariate distribu-
tions in both the “treatment” and “control” groups are now similar, meaning
the much reduced sample size strengthens rather than undermines the sub-
sequent statistical inference. Hence, I proceed to estimating a “between”
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Figure 4.8: Coefficient plot of multilevel “within-between” random effects models (without
outliers). The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the age-standardised county
mortality rate from drug use disorders; the main predictors are the county jail and prison
admissions rates per 100,000 population, adjusted for aggregate annual time trends us-
ing year dummies; control variables are added and removed one by one; the figure shows
parameter estimates and corresponding 95% confidence intervals; all predictors are stan-
dardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard
deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the percentage change in the drug-related mortal-
ity rate associated with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor.
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model using simple linear regression, where the outcome, Y , is regressed on
T . In this model, I also integrate data on variation in opioid prescription
rates at the county level between 2006 and 2014. The model is visualised
in Figure 4.9. It compares counties with incarceration rates at one standard
deviation below the global mean (T = 0) to those with incarceration rates at
one standard deviation above the global mean (T = 1). The model simulates
counterfactuals by comparing counties with and without the presence of high
rates of incarceration. In other words, to use the language of clinical trials,
how does the mortality rate from drug use disorders change when compar-
ing a county under “treatment” to one in the “control” group, (most) other
things being equal?
I first estimate the expected value of deaths from drug use disorders for
a county that is in the “control” group, meaning it has an incarceration rate
at one standard deviation below the global mean. According to the model,
as seen in the first density plot (in green), its mortality rate from drug use
disorders lies at 3.5 deaths per 100,000 county residents (95% CI: [3.3, 3.7];
P < 0.001). Next, I estimate the expected value of the mortality rate for a
county that only differs from the first in that it has incarceration rates that lie
at one standard deviation above the global mean. As evidenced by the second
(black) density plot, this raises the mortality rate from 3.5 to 5.4 deaths per
100,000 county residents (95% CI: [5.2, 5.6]; P < 0.001). As conveyed by the
third and final density (in dark pink), which shows the first difference in the
expected value of the mortality rate for the different treatment states, these
results suggest that, on average, the experience of high incarceration rates
corresponds to 1.9 excess deaths per 100,000 county residents (95% CI: [1.5,
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2.2]; P < 0.001). In terms of the semi-elasticity of Y with respect to T , this
result suggests a “treatment effect” equal to a 53.5% increase in the death
rate from drug use disorders.
As one possible robustness check, I modify the matching algorithm to
split counties into alternative “treatment” states. In this specification, T
is set to 1 for any county above the 60th percentile of county jail or prison
incarceration, and to 0 otherwise. I then pre-process the data once more us-
ing coarsened exact matching. The substantive quantities of interest remain
similar, as conveyed by Figure 4.10. Counties in the “control” group have
an average mortality rate from drug use disorders equal to 4.1 deaths per
100,000 population (95% CI: [3.9, 4.3]; P < 0.001), whereas counties with
high incarceration rates have an average drug-related mortality rate equal
to 5.5 deaths per 100,000 population (95% CI: [5.2, 5.7]; P < 0.001). This
amounts to 1.4 excess deaths (95% CI: [1.0, 1.7]; P < 0.001), which is equiv-
alent to a 32.9% increase in drug-related mortality rates associated with high
rates of incarceration.
4.4 Discussion
The findings presented above suggest a strong association between the rise
of the penal state and the ongoing overdose epidemic. The results seem to
hold over and above the links between economic decline, the local ethno-
racial composition, the drug environment, or crime rates. This chapter also
highlights a largely neglected dimension of the American criminal justice sys-
tem, namely local jails, which are independently associated with drug-related
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Figure 4.9: Density plots of simulated expected values of drug-related mortality given a
“treatment” (T ) state. The outcome variable is the age-standardised mortality rate from
drug use disorders; the model compares counties with incarceration rates at one standard
deviation below the global mean (T = 0) to those with incarceration rates at one standard
deviation above the global mean (T = 1); the association between drug-related mortality
and “treatment” is estimated by applying a simple linear regression model to a pruned data
set that is pre-processed using coarsened exact matching. N = 963.
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Figure 4.10: Density plots of simulated expected values of drug-related mortality given a
“treatment” (T ) state. The outcome variable is the age-standardised mortality rate from
drug use disorders; “treatment” is defined as above the 60th percentile of county jail or
prison incarceration rates; the association between drug-related mortality and “treatment”
is estimated by applying a simple linear regression model to a pruned data set that is pre-
processed using coarsened exact matching; counties are matched on the same variables as
in Figure 4.9 above. N = 989.
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deaths. The use of panel data sheds light on regional inequalities over time
and thus helps unpack the potential directionality of relevant associations
between criminal justice and substance abuse that have been identified in a
recent cross-sectional study of individuals (Winkelman et al., 2018).
I acknowledge the limitations of this analysis. First, there is the question
of whether the link between incarceration and drug-related mortality is sub-
ject to selection bias and thus whether the impact of incarceration per se has
been statistically identified (see for instance Johnson and Easterling, 2012;
Wildeman et al., 2013). In any observational study, there is always a concern
that an observed association can be explained away by some unaccounted-
for third factor related to both the treatment and the outcome. However,
considerable unmeasured confounding would be needed to explain away the
model estimates presented above, which are adjusted for the most likely con-
founders in the American context. The fixed effects model eliminates any
time-invariant confounders within counties, whilst the matching procedure
helps balance covariates distributions between counties. Those who face in-
carceration do indeed have different health profiles compared to the general
population (National Research Council, 2014: 204–213), but the transition
from poor health to actual mortality seems to be accelerated by the experi-
ence, first-hand or vicarious, of penal confinement. The interaction between
drug abuse and incarceration interferes with treatment and reduces the like-
lihood of recovery (Fiscella et al., 2004; Nunn et al., 2009; National Research
Council, 2014: 217–219; Maradiaga et al., 2016). Moreover, the above anal-
ysis suggests that jails and prisons are associated with heightened mortality
risk for the population at large, and not only for those individuals who are
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most directly affected by the carceral apparatus. Finally, as outlined in chap-
ter 3, existing research on the effects of incarceration on a range of social,
economic, and health outcomes lends credence to my principal hypothesis
that punitive social policy, notably in the wake of economic decline, is a
likely driver of regional variation in drug-related mortality.
Second, the analysis could have profited from better data. A multilevel
framework in which individuals are nested in neighbourhoods, which in turn
are nested in cities, counties, and states, would allow for a more refined ex-
amination of the associations at work and would also help better address the
aforementioned concern surrounding endogeneity. As mentioned earlier (see
Figure 8 in the Introduction), incarceration only constitutes one part of a
broader set of operations of the penal state and there are currently no con-
sistent data collections that would allow for a systematic analysis of these,
including probation and parole. Nonetheless, although my data set does not
cover all states, it contains empirical data on jail and prison incarceration
rates at the county level for the very first time. My measurement of in-
come decline is at the aggregate level and would ideally be complemented by
a more comprehensive set of economic indicators, including import-export
flows, labour force participation rates, and employment dynamics (see e.g.
Pierce and Schott, 2016b; Ruhm, 2018).
Third, partly as a consequence of these data limitations, the statisti-
cal models presented above cannot do justice to the causal complexity at
work, as visualised in Figure 3.1. Most notably, in light of the socially
differentiated operations of the penal state, an examination of heterogeneous
“treatment effects” and mediating pathways across diverse sociospatial and
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temporal dimensions would be of particular interest. However, in the absence
of individual-level data and more refined measures of likely mediators and
moderators, I have refrained from such an endeavour in the present analysis.
The different model specifications yield results of differing magnitudes, but
these pertain to differences in the distribution of variation within and be-
tween counties, and can be considered reasonable bounds on the magnitude
of potential relationships. The parameter estimates are largely consistent
across the different models, my substantive findings are robust to alternative
specifications, and the parsimonious models successfully capture a substan-
tial portion of the variation in the data.
4.5 Conclusion
There is a need to understand why drug-related mortality rates are subject to
substantial regional variation if roadmaps to intervention and prevention are
to be developed. The findings of this chapter suggest that incarceration may
be an important upstream determinant of mortality from drug use disorders
in the United States, over and above the effects of economic decline and other
usual suspects. Jails and prisons are associated with heightened mortality
risk, not only for people sent there but for the population at large. The
rapid expansion of the penal state over the past few decades may thus have
contributed significantly to the ongoing wave of drug-related deaths.
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Chapter 5
Penal expansion, mortality, and
life expectancy
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated a robust association between high rates
of jail and prison incarceration and higher rates of mortality from drug use
disorders. This chapter expands the empirical lens to ask whether penal ex-
pansion can help explain broader patterns of vital inequality. As described in
chapter 3, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the macro-level forces of which
rapid penal expansion is a prominent manifestation shape a wide gamut of
health outcomes via a complex set of interlocking mechanisms. In this chap-
ter, I examine three forms of vital inequality: inequalities in age-standardised
all-cause mortality rates, inequalities in the risk of premature death between
the ages of 25 and 45, and inequalities in life expectancy at birth. Figures 5.1,
5.2, and 5.3 show the evolution of these three variables at the county level
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between 1980 and 2014. The all-cause mortality rate and life expectancy at
birth have improved on average over time, but inequalities have increased.
For instance, the healthiest counties have gained around 6 years of life ex-
pectancy in the given time period, whereas the unhealthiest have gained
around 4 years. The life expectancy gap has gone from around 15 years
in 1980 to almost 20 years in 2014. The premature mortality risk between
the ages of 25 and 45 has moderately improved, but the most disadvantaged
counties have not experienced any drastic reduction in such risk over the past
three and a half decades.
5.2 Empirical strategy
Data
My empirical strategy in this chapter is similar to that of chapter 4. I use data
from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (Dwyer-Lindgren, 2016;
2017) to measure county-level age-standardised all-cause mortality rates, the
risk of premature death between the ages of 25 and 45, and life expectancy
at birth. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 5.1.
The regressors are the same as in the previous chapter (see Table 4.1). Table
5.2 shows the Spearman correlations between all the variables used in the
analysis. The reader will note the perfect inverse correlation between all-
cause mortality rates and life expectancy at birth. The reason I include both
outcomes in this chapter is that life expectancy lends itself to easier, more
intuitive interpretation (few people think in terms of age-standardised all-
cause mortality rates). However, as noted by Case and Deaton (2017: 400),
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of age-standardised all-cause mortality rates, 1980–2014.
97
Figure 5.2: Evolution of premature mortality risk, ages 25 to 45, 1980–2014.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of life expectancy at birth, 1980–2014.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
All-cause mortality rate 69,562 980.0 138.4 323.3 1,716.8
Premature mortality risk 69,562 3.4 0.9 1.2 10.2
Life expectancy at birth 69,562 76.1 2.3 66.2 86.8
Notes: Rates are per 100,000 county residents; the all-cause mortality rate is age-
standardised; the premature mortality risk measures the probability of death between the
ages of 25 and 45, and it is interpreted as a percentage probability.
life expectancy is more sensitive to child mortality compared to midlife or old-
age mortality, and may thus shroud heterogeneity across the life course. This
is why, in addition to age-standardised all-cause mortality, I include measures
of premature mortality in the 25–45 age range – which is also a demographic
that is central to the operations of the penal state. The reader will note,
from reading Table 5.1, that variation in the probability of premature death
is substantial, ranging from around 1 in 100 residents to over 1 in 10 residents.
Methods
My methodological approach is the same as in the previous chapter (see
section 4.2). For each of the three outcomes, I estimate a fixed effects panel
regression. I then partition the within- and between-county variation using





































































































































































































































































































































































a time. To further investigate between-county inequalities, I once again use
coarsened exact matching to obtain covariate balance before regressing each
outcome variable on a “treatment” variable. As before, I compare counties
at one standard deviation below the global incarceration average to those at
one standard deviation above the average.
5.3 Findings
5.3.1 All-cause mortality
Figure 5.4 shows a clear bivariate association between median household
income and all-cause mortality rates at the county level. This association is
even more distinct than the one between income and mortality rates from
drug use disorders, as visualised in Figure 4.2 in the previous chapter. Figures
5.5 and 5.6 further suggest that incarceration may be contributing to this
association, notably in light on the strong link between poverty and penal
confinement (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
Table 5.3 shows the results of the fixed effects panel regression for all-
cause mortality rates. A one standard deviation increase in jail and prison
admissions rates is associated with a 0.5% (95% CI: [0.4, 0.7]; P < 0.001)
and a 1.2% (95% CI: [1.1, 1.3]; P < 0.001) increase in all-cause mortality
rates, respectively. These estimates remain virtually identical when addi-
tionally controlling for the local mortality rate from drug use disorders. This
suggests that the model is not simply capturing the effects of the overdose
epidemic, as was documented in the previous chapter. In other words, penal
expansion seems to affect the broader dynamics of vital inequality, as pro-
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Figure 5.4: Bivariate association between median household income and age-standardised
all-cause mortality (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 5.5: Bivariate association between jail admissions rate and age-standardised all-
cause mortality (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 5.6: Bivariate association between prison admissions rate and age-standardised
all-cause mortality (1980–2014 average).
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posed in chapter 3. Once again, some of the other coefficients are difficult
to interpret, and must be read with caution. For instance, in this model, a
higher fraction of high school graduates is associated with a higher mortality
rate (β = 6.5%; 95% CI: [6.0, 7.0]; P < 0.001). Given that such variables
are nearly time-invariant, the corresponding coefficients may be considered
unreliable.
I assess whether a significant portion of the variation in mortality lies be-
tween rather than within counties. The variance partition coefficient (VPC)
is calculated from a multilevel “null” model and is equal to 74.2%. This
means that around three-quarters of the total variation in all-cause mortality
lies between counties, pointing once again to the utility of a “within-between”
specification. The baseline “within-between” model without any control vari-
ables (apart from year dummies) is displayed in Table 5.4. The within-county
estimates are similar to those of the fixed effects regression: for each one stan-
dard deviation increase in jail and prison admissions rates, all-cause mortality
rates are associated with a 0.7% (95% CI: [0.6, 0.8]; P < 0.001) and a 1.5%
(95% CI: [1.4, 1.6]; P < 0.001) increase, respectively. Between counties,
a one standard deviation rise in jail and prison admissions rates is asso-
ciated with a 1.2% (95% CI: [0.7, 1.7]; P < 0.001) and a 5.4% (95% CI:
[4.9, 5.8]; P < 0.001) increase, respectively. Comparing the baseline model
to the “null” model reveals that the addition of both incarceration predic-
tors reduces the intercept (between-county) variance by over 25% and the
residual (within-county) variance by nearly 80%. Figure 5.7 visualises the
parameter estimates and corresponding confidence intervals for each of the
control models. The reader will note that the “between” estimates for jail
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Table 5.3: Fixed effects panel regression model of all-cause mortality rates
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Jail admissions rate 0.5% 0.1 < 0.001
Prison admissions rate 1.2% 0.1 < 0.001
Household income decline 3.2% 0.2 < 0.001
Fraction high school graduates 6.5% 0.3 < 0.001
Fraction African Americans 2.8% 0.7 < 0.001
Fraction Hispanics 1.7% 0.4 < 0.001
Fraction other ethnicity -3.0% 0.6 < 0.001
Violent crime rate 0.5% 0.1 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the age-standardised county all-
cause mortality rate; the main predictors are the county jail admissions rate and the county
prison admissions rate per 100,000 population; the model controls for decline in median
county household income, the county fraction of high school graduates, African Americans,
Hispanics, or other non-White ethnicity, the county violent crime rate, and for aggregate
annual time trends using year dummies (not displayed); robust panel-corrected standard
errors are presented in the second column; all predictors are standardised by calculating
deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are
interpreted as the percentage change in the all-cause mortality rate associated with a one
standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 57, 732. R2 = 85.6%.
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admissions rates is rendered statistically insignificant when controlling for
reduced median household income or higher high school graduation rates.
The “within” estimates remain robust to such controls, however, as do the
coefficients for prison admissions rates across all models. Furthermore, the
“between” coefficient for education has reversed sign, as expected, mean-
ing the larger the fraction of high school graduates, the lower the all-cause
mortality rate. As for the ethno-racial composition of counties, the model
indicates a persistent mortality disadvantage for African Americans, but an
advantage for Hispanics (consistent with the so-called “Hispanic health para-
dox”), whereas other ethnic minorities are more ambiguously positioned. As
expected, higher rates of violent crime are associated with higher mortality
rates.
The matching algorithm generates a pruned data set with N = 963. As
in the previous chapter, I first estimate the expected value of the outcome
variable for a county that is in the “control” group, meaning it has an in-
carceration rate at one standard deviation below the global mean. As seen
in the first density plot (in gray) in Figure 5.8, its age-standardised all-cause
mortality rate is equal to 901.0 deaths per 100,000 county residents (95%
CI: [892.4, 909.6]; P < 0.001). Next, I estimate the expected value of the
all-cause mortality rate for a county that only differs from the first in that
it has incarceration rates that lie at one standard deviation above the global
mean. As evidenced by the second (black) density plot, this raises the mor-
tality rate from 901.0 to 955.8 deaths per 100,000 county residents (95% CI:
[947.1, 964.5]; P < 0.001). As conveyed by the third and final density (in
red), which shows the first difference in the expected value of the mortality
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Table 5.4: “Within-between” panel regression model of all-cause mortality
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Jail admissions rate
Within 0.7% 0.02 < 0.001
Between 1.2% 0.2 < 0.001
Prison admissions rate
Within 1.5% 0.02 < 0.001
Between 5.4% 0.2 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the age-standardised county all-
cause mortality rate; the main predictors are the county jail admissions rate and the county
prison admissions rate per 100,000 population; the model only controls for aggregate annual
time trends using year dummies (not displayed); all predictors are standardised by calculat-
ing deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients
are interpreted as the percentage change in the all-cause mortality rate associated with a
one standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 64, 814.
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Figure 5.7: Coefficient plot of multilevel “within-between” random effects models. The
outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the age-standardised county all-cause mortality
rate; the main predictors are the county jail and prison admissions rates per 100,000
population, adjusted for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies; control variables
are added and removed one by one; the figure shows parameter estimates and corresponding
95% confidence intervals; all predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the
variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the
percentage change in the all-cause mortality rate associated with a one standard deviation
increase in each predictor.
110
Figure 5.8: Density plots of simulated expected values of the all-cause mortality rate given
a “treatment” (T ) state. The outcome variable is the age-standardised all-cause mortality
rate; the model compares counties with incarceration rates at one standard deviation below
the global mean (T = 0) to those with incarceration rates at one standard deviation above
the global mean (T = 1); the association between all-cause mortality and “treatment” is
estimated by applying a simple linear regression model to a pruned data set that is pre-
processed using coarsened exact matching; counties are matched on the same variables as
in Figure 4.9 in the previous chapter. N = 963.
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rate for the different treatment states, these results suggest that, on average,
the experience of high incarceration rates corresponds to 54.8 excess deaths
per 100,000 county residents (95% CI: [41.7, 68.0]; P < 0.001). In terms of
the semi-elasticity of Y with respect to T , this result suggests a “treatment
effect” equal to a 6.1% increase in the all-cause death rate.
5.3.2 Premature mortality risk
Figure 5.9 shows a strong bivariate association between median household
income and the probability of death between the ages of 25 and 45, even
more so than for the all-cause mortality in Figure 5.4. Figures 5.10 and 5.11
highlight once again that incarceration may play a central role in the making
of this association.
Table 5.5 shows the results of the fixed effects regression model of pre-
mature mortality risk. The coefficients are very similar to those displayed
for all-cause mortality rates in Table 5.3. For instance, for each standard
deviation increase in jail or prison admissions rates, the premature mortality
risk is expected to increase by 0.5% (95% CI: [0.4, 0.6]; P < 0.001) and
1.2% (95% CI: [1.1, 1.3]; P < 0.001), respectively. However, in this case, the
VPC is equal to 91.5%, meaning the vast majority of the total variation in
premature mortality risk is located between rather than within counties.
The baseline “within-between” model without controls is shown in Ta-
ble 5.6 and the control models are shown in Figure 5.12. In these models,
both kinds of incarceration are robust to all controls and, once again, the
“between” estimates provide more meaningful results for some of the other
covariates, especially education. As expected, the “between” effects tend to
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Figure 5.9: Bivariate association between median household income and probability of
premature death (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 5.10: Bivariate association between jail admissions rate and probability of premature
death (1980–2014 average).
114
Figure 5.11: Bivariate association between prison admissions rate and probability of pre-
mature death (1980–2014 average).
115
Table 5.5: Fixed effects panel regression model of premature mortality risk
Coefficient Standard error P -value
County jail admissions rate 0.5% 0.1 < 0.001
County prison admissions rate 1.2% 0.1 < 0.001
Household income decline 3.3% 0.2 < 0.001
Fraction high school graduates 6.9% 0.3 < 0.001
Fraction African Americans 4.4% 0.9 < 0.001
Fraction Hispanics 1.7% 0.4 < 0.001
Fraction other ethnicity -3.2% 0.6 < 0.001
Violent crime rate 0.5% 0.1 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the premature mortality risk be-
tween the ages of 25 and 45; the main predictors are the county jail admissions rate and
the county prison admissions rate per 100,000 population; the model controls for decline
in median county household income, the county fraction of high school graduates, African
Americans, Hispanics, or other non-White ethnicity, the county violent crime rate, and for
aggregate annual time trends using year dummies (not displayed); robust panel-corrected
standard errors are presented in the second column; all predictors are standardised by
calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation;
coefficients are interpreted as the percentage change in the premature mortality risk asso-
ciated with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 57, 732. R2 = 82.0%.
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Table 5.6: “Within-between” panel regression model of premature mortality risk
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Jail admissions rate
Within 0.7% 0.03 < 0.001
Between 4.7% 0.4 < 0.001
Prison admissions rate
Within 1.5% 0.02 < 0.001
Between 11.1% 0.4 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the premature mortality risk
between the ages of 25 and 45; the main predictors are the county jail admissions rate
and the county prison admissions rate per 100,000 population; the model only controls
for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies (not displayed); all predictors are
standardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard
deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the percentage change in the premature mortality
risk associated with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 64, 814.
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Figure 5.12: Coefficient plot of multilevel “within-between” random effects models. The
outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the premature mortality risk between the ages
of 25 and 45; the main predictors are the county jail and prison admissions rates per
100,000 population, adjusted for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies; con-
trol variables are added and removed one by one; the figure shows parameter estimates
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals; all predictors are standardised by calculating
deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are
interpreted as the percentage change in the premature mortality risk associated with a one
standard deviation increase in each predictor.
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Figure 5.13: Density plots of simulated expected values of premature mortality risk given a
continuous “treatment” (T ) state. The outcome variable is the premature mortality risk;
the model compares counties with incarceration rates at one standard deviation below the
global mean (T = 0) to those with incarceration rates at one standard deviation above the
global mean (T = 1); the association between premature mortality risk and “treatment” is
estimated by applying a simple linear regression model to a pruned data set that is pre-
processed using coarsened exact matching; counties are matched on the same variables as
in Figure 4.9 in the previous chapter. N = 963.
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be larger than the “within” effects. In the baseline model, each standard
deviation increase in jail or prison rates is associated with a 0.7% (95% CI:
[0.6, 0.7]; P < 0.001) and a 1.5% (95% CI: [1.4, 1.6]; P < 0.001) increase
in the premature mortality risk within counties, respectively. Between coun-
ties, the corresponding figures are 4.7% (95% CI: [3.9, 5.6]; P < 0.001) and
11.1% (95% CI: [10.3, 12.0]; P < 0.001), respectively. Comparing the base-
line model to the “null” model shows that the addition of both incarceration
predictors reduces the intercept (“between”) variance by a remarkable 94%
and the residual (“within”) variance by 98%.
The results of the simulation-based “between” model are shows in Figure
5.13. Counties in the “control” group have an average premature mortality
risk equal to 2.7% (95% CI: [2.6, 2.7]; P < 0.001), whereas counties with
high incarceration rates have an average premature mortality risk equal to
3.2% (95% CI: [3.1, 3.2]; P < 0.001). The first difference is half a percentage
point (95% CI: [0.4, 0.6]; P < 0.001), which amounts to a semi-elasticity of
19.0% in the probability of death between the ages of 25 and 45 with respect
to high rates of incarceration.
5.3.3 Life expectancy
Figures 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16 visualise the same bivariate associations as were
presented above for all-cause mortality rates and premature mortality risk,
only this time for life expectancy at birth. As expected, there seems to be
a strong relationship between economic deprivation and life expectancy, but
also between incarceration rates and life expectancy.
The results for the fixed effects regression are shown in Table 5.7. Here
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Figure 5.14: Bivariate association between median household income and life expectancy
at birth (1980–2014 average).
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Figure 5.15: Bivariate association between jail admissions rate and life expectancy at birth
(1980–2014 average).
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Figure 5.16: Bivariate association between prison admissions rate and life expectancy at
birth (1980–2014 average).
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the outcome variable is not log-transformed, thus rendering coefficients in-
terpretable as the change (in years) in life expectancy associated with a one
standard deviation increase in each regressor. Thus longevity at the county
level is expected to decrease by 0.06 years (95% CI: [0.045, 0.073]; P < 0.001)
for each rise in jail admissions rates and by over one-tenth of a year (β =
-0.14; 95% CI: [-0.15, -0.12]; P < 0.001) for each increase in prison admissions
rates. Reduced median household income is associated with a four-month
decline in life expectancy (β = -0.32; 95% CI: [-0.37, -0.27]; P < 0.001),
whilst violent crime has a similar coefficient to jail incarceration (β = -0.06;
95% CI: [-0.08, -0.04]; P < 0.001). As noted earlier, the other coefficients
are more readily interpretable in an alternative model specification. Also in
this model, a substantial amount of variation in life expectancy is captured
(R2 = 91.4%).
A multilevel “null” model reveals a VPC equal to 77.2%, meaning over
three-quarters of the total variation in life expectancy at birth lies between
rather than within counties. The baseline “within-between” model is shown
in Table 5.8. The “within” estimates are largely similar to those produced by
the fixed effects regression. The “between” estimates suggest that for each
standard deviation increase in incarceration rates, life expectancy is expected
to decrease by about a quarter of a year in the case of jails (β = -0.26; 95%
CI: [-0.33, -0.20]; P < 0.001) and by almost a full year in the case of prisons
(β = -0.90; 95% CI: [-1.00, -0.83]; P < 0.001). Comparing the baseline
model to the “null” model reveals that the addition of both incarceration
predictors reduces the intercept (“between”) variance by over 30% and the
residual (“within”) variance by 88%.
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Table 5.7: Fixed effects panel regression model of life expectancy at birth
Coefficient Standard error P -value
County jail admissions rate -0.06 0.01 < 0.001
County prison admissions rate -0.14 0.01 < 0.001
Household income decline -0.32 0.02 < 0.001
Fraction high school graduates -0.60 0.03 < 0.001
Fraction African Americans -0.38 0.09 < 0.001
Fraction Hispanics -0.11 0.05 0.03
Fraction other ethnicity 0.29 0.07 < 0.001
Violent crime rate -0.06 0.01 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is county-level life expectancy at birth; the main predictors are
the county jail admissions rate and the county prison admissions rate per 100,000 popula-
tion; the model controls for decline in median county household income, the county fraction
of high school graduates, African Americans, Hispanics, or other non-White ethnicity, the
county violent crime rate, and for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies (not
displayed); robust panel-corrected standard errors are presented in the second column; all
predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing
by one standard deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the change (in years) in life ex-
pectancy associated with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 57, 732.
R2 = 91.4%.
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Table 5.8: “Within-between” panel regression of life expectancy at birth
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Jail admissions rate
Within -0.08 0.003 < 0.001
Between -0.26 0.04 < 0.001
Prison admissions rate
Within -0.17 0.003 < 0.001
Between -0.90 0.04 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is county-level life expectancy at birth; the main predictors
are the county jail admissions rate and the county prison admissions rate per 100,000
population; the model only controls for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies
(not displayed); all predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the variable
mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the change
(in years) in life expectancy associated with a one standard deviation increase in each
predictor. N = 64, 814.
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The control models are visualised in Figure 5.17, which suggests that
the above estimates are robust. Both jail and prison admissions rates are
significantly associated with reduced life expectancy in all models. For all
regressors, the “within” and “between” estimates carry the same sign, with
the exception of high school graduation rates – which, as expected, are as-
sociated with higher life expectancy between counties – and non-White eth-
nic minorities other than African Americans and Hispanics, whose residen-
tial concentration is associated with lower life expectancy. Otherwise, also
African Americans suffer from reduced longevity, whereas Hispanics tend to
live longer. As expected, low income or income decline and violent crime are
associated with lower life expectancy.
Figure 5.18 shows the results of the simulation-based modelling approach.
Counties with low incarceration rates have an average life expectancy of
77.6 years (95% CI: [77.4, 77.7]; P < 0.001), whereas counties with high
incarceration rates have an average life expectancy of 76.5 years (95% CI:
[76.4, 76.6]; P < 0.001). The first difference in expected values is -1.1 years
(95% CI: [-1.3, -0.9]; P < 0.001). In other words, high rates of incarceration
are associated with life expectancy at birth being reduced by over a whole
year.
5.4 Discussion
The findings of this chapter seem to confirm the hypothesis that high rates
of incarceration can shape the dynamics of vital inequality beyond its effects
on the overdose epidemic. However, the same limitations as were highlighted
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Figure 5.17: Coefficient plot of multilevel “within-between” random effects models. The
outcome variable is county-level life expectancy at birth; the main predictors are the county
jail and prison admissions rates per 100,000 population, adjusted for aggregate annual time
trends using year dummies; control variables are added and removed one by one; the figure
shows parameter estimates and corresponding 95% confidence intervals; all predictors are
standardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard
deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the change (in years) in life expectancy associated
with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor.
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Figure 5.18: Density plots of simulated expected values of life expectancy at birth given a
continuous “treatment” (T ) state. The outcome variable is the premature mortality risk;
the model compares counties with incarceration rates at one standard deviation below the
global mean (T = 0) to those with incarceration rates at one standard deviation above the
global mean (T = 1); the association between life expectancy and “treatment” is estimated
by applying a simple linear regression model to a pruned data set that is pre-processed
using coarsened exact matching; counties are matched on the same variables as in Figure
4.9 in the previous chapter. N = 963.
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in the previous chapter also apply here. Most notably, the data limitations
and research design preclude any strict causal inference to be drawn from
the analysis although jail and prison incarceration rates seem to be deeply
implicated in deepening inequalities in health and wellbeing in the United
States. Moreover, although I have hypothesised about a number of plausible
mechanisms by which penal expansion may affect the health of individuals,
local communities, and even entire populations, the challenge remains to
empirically flesh these out. However, as noted before, this would require
access to high-quality multilevel data.
That being said, the above analyses suggest a robust association be-
tween the rise of the penal state and vital inequality, as measured in three
different ways, namely all-cause mortality, premature mortality risk, and life
expectancy at birth. Especially for inequalities in premature mortality risk,
incarceration accounts for an astounding proportion of variation both within
and between counties. This association holds up across a number of different
model specifications and provides reasonable estimates of the magnitude of
the relevant relationships. Once again, light was shed on the role of a hith-
erto largely neglected component of the American criminal justice system,
namely jail incarceration, and a substantial amount of variation within and




Both jails and prisons may be construed as vectors of vital inequality in
the United States. This chapter shows that high rates of incarceration seem
to affect population health not only through rising mortality from drug use
disorders, as was documented in the previous chapter, but also through other
pathways that shape the social and spatial patterning of disability, disease,
and death. The findings suggest that in the wake of economic decline and
deepening social division, protective rather than punitive political responses
may help to shield vulnerable populations from attendant deleterious health





income and health revisited
6.1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Raj Chetty and colleagues (2016) examine the relation-
ship between income and life expectancy in the United States between 2001
and 2014. They demonstrate how life expectancy tends to rise with income
and how health inequalities between top and bottom income groups have
widened rapidly over time. Moreover, whilst the rich tend to live longer
everywhere, life expectancy amongst the poor shows significant geographi-
cal variation. The authors suggest a role for local area characteristics but
refrain from further analysis. In this chapter, I seek to examine state-level
determinants of life expectancy in the bottom income quartile. At the cost
of lower geographical (and temporal) resolution than in previous chapters, I
expand the investigation of economic decline, which thus far has only been
132
operationalised as reduced median household income. In the present chapter,
I study variation in longevity amongst those in the bottom quartile of the
American income distribution, with an eye on how such variation may be
shaped by a different economic factor, namely the fragmentation of labour
through deindustrialisation, as was described in chapter 2.
6.2 Empirical strategy
Data
My principal outcome variable is state-level life expectancy at age 40 in the
bottom quartile of the income distribution between 2001 and 2014 for all
50 states. These public-use data from the Health Inequality Project (2016)
are generated from 1.4 billion tax records between 1999 and 2014 linked to
mortality data from Social Security Administration death records. Deindus-
trialisation is measured by the annual state-level job destruction rate in the
manufacturing sector (North American Industry Classification System sector
31-33), i.e. the number of jobs lost to establishment contraction or closure
in a year divided by the employment at the beginning of the year. Data on
employment and job destruction come from the U.S. Census Statistics of U.S.
Businesses Employment Change Data Tables. State-level incarceration rates
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics express the count of prisoners serving
sentences of more than 1 year per 100,000 state residents. These are prison –
not jail – incarceration rates, since prisons are state-level institutions whereas
jails are run by local counties within states.
I draw on a series of data sources to conduct a sensitivity analysis. I
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calculate the state fraction of those earning less than $25,000 per annum
(p.a.) who are overweight or obese; who, at the time of being surveyed,
have gone without physical exercise in the past 30 days; who are current
smokers; and who are without any form of health insurance. The same
variables are also calculated for those earning more than $75,000 p.a. as
proxy controls for the top income quartile. These income thresholds, roughly
corresponding to the top and bottom income quartiles, are the ones defined
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s survey design. I also
assess the robustness of the main predictors to state government expenditure
on workers’ insurance, healthcare, and welfare, as well as the state drug
overdose and homicide rates, state GDP per capita, economic growth, the
relative size of the manufacturing sector, and labour force participation rates.
Variable definitions and sources are listed below, descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 6.1, and a Spearman correlation matrix is presented in
Table 6.2.
• Social spending. Definition: amount (in U.S. dollars) spent by state
government in each fiscal year on workers’ insurance trusts divided
by state population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau: State Government
Finances.
• Health spending. Definition: amount (in U.S. dollars) spent by state
government in each fiscal year on healthcare divided by state popula-
tion. Source: U.S. Census Bureau: State Government Finances.
• Welfare spending. Definition: amount (in U.S. dollars) spent by state
government in each fiscal year on public welfare divided by state pop-
134
ulation. Source: U.S. Census Bureau: State Government Finances.
• Fraction obese. Definition: fraction of individuals earning less than
$25,000 p.a./more than $75,000 p.a. who are either overweight or obese.
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System.
• Fraction physically inactive. Definition: fraction of individuals earning
less than $25,000 p.a./more than $75,000 p.a. who have not engaged
in physical exercise in the past 30 days. Source: Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.
• Fraction smokers. Definition: fraction of individuals earning less than
$25,000 p.a./more than $75,000 p.a. who are current smokers. Source:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System.
• Fraction uninsured. Definition: fraction of individuals earning less
than $25,000 p.a./more than $75,000 p.a. without any form of med-
ical insurance. Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.
• Overdose mortality rate. Definition: number of state level deaths per
100,000 state residents amongst individuals aged 20-64 years. Source:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Compressed Mortality
database (codes X40-44, X60-64, X85, Y10-14).
• Homicide rate. Definition: total number of murders committed per 100
000 state residents. Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation: Uniform
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Crime Reporting Statistics.
• GDP per capita. Definition: state real gross domestic product in thou-
sands of U.S. dollars divided by state population estimate. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis: Regional Economic Accounts.
• GDP growth. Definition: annual change in state real gross domes-
tic product in thousands of U.S. dollars divided by state population
estimate. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis: Regional Economic
Accounts.
• Size of manufacturing. Definition: total state employment in manu-
facturing sector at the start of each year divided by total employment
across all sectors. Source: U.S. Census Bureau: Statistics of U.S. Busi-
nesses.
• Labour force participation rate. Definition: civilian labour force as per-
centage of total state population. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics:
Local Areas Unemployment Statistics.
Methods
Due to the new unit of analysis (the state) and a significantly smaller sample
size (N = 700) as compared to the previous two chapters, I confine my
methodological approach to estimating fixed effects panel regressions. This is
because the data lack the statistical power to separately estimate within- and
between-state coefficients, and the data pruning effected through matching
would result in having virtually no data left for the actual analysis. Instead,
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Life expectancy Q1 700 79.6 1.5 73.9 83.7
Life expectancy Q4 700 87.0 1.6 80.8 91.5
Deindustrialisation 700 11.2 3.5 0.0 27.5
Prison incarceration rate 697 399.7 145.1 127.0 881.0
Social spending 700 695.0 322.9 156.2 1,833
Health spending 700 186.2 98.9 40.8 529.9
Welfare spending 700 1,324 443.6 402.5 2,948
Fraction obese 699 0.6 0.04 0.4 0.7
Fraction physically inactive 694 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5
Fraction smokers 699 0.3 0.04 0.2 0.4
Fraction uninsured 694 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4
Overdose mortality rate 700 18.4 7.7 2.6 54.7
Homicide rate 750 4.5 2.3 0.6 14.6
GDP per capita 750 45,804 8,639 28,856 73,464
GDP growth 700 343.5 1,245 −4,512 11,009
Size of manufacturing 650 11.3 4.4 2.4 23.2
Labour force participation rate 700 66.1 4.2 53.3 76.1
Notes: All variables are at the state level between 2001 and 2014; Q1 = bottom income
quartile; Q4 = top income quartile; rates are per 100,000 state residents; deindustrialisa-
tion is the annual percentage of jobs destroyed in the manufacturing sector; government



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I present a baseline fixed effects model adjusted for aggregate time trends,
before conducting a sensitivity analysis where state-level control variables
are introduced into and removed from the unadjusted baseline model one
by one to avoid over-specification. As an additional robustness check, I run
alternative control models with multiple control variables grouped into three
categories. Given that I am investigating aggregate life expectancy in the
bottom income quartile at the state level, I lag the two main predictors by
one year to allow for delayed effects to manifest. To assess the degree to which
deindustrialisation and incarceration rates not only account for variation in
life expectancy amongst the poor, but also drive inequalities between the top
and the bottom of the income distribution, I run the same models with life
expectancy in the top income quartile as the outcome variable as a point of
comparison.
6.3 Findings
Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of the life expectancy gap between the top
and bottom income quartiles between 2001 and 2014. The plot suggests a
clear increase in inequality over time. In Figure 6.2, life expectancy at age
40 in the bottom income quartile is plotted against job destruction rate in
manufacturing, lagged one year, as a measure of deindustrialisation. A linear
estimator is used to measure the gradient between the two variables, which
is negative. Thus, an increase in deindustrialisation in a given year is neg-
atively associated with life expectancy amongst the poor in the following
year. Figure 6.3 is similar, only this time life expectancy at age 40 is plotted
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against state level incarceration rates per 100,000 state residents, also lagged
one year. The slope is negative and steep, indicating a pronounced inverse
association between life expectancy and high imprisonment. The time series
plot in Figure 6.4 compares the level of life expectancy in the bottom income
quartile between states characterised by low and high incarceration rates over
time. The plot conveys how inequalities between low- and high-incarceration
states are distinct: poor lives are over one year shorter in states in the top
incarceration decile (mean incarceration rate = 694.7 prisoners per 100,000
residents) relative to states in the bottom decile (mean incarceration rate
= 185.2 prisoners per 100,000 residents), and there is some indication of a
growing gap. Moreover, Figures 6.5 and 6.6 enable an approximate estima-
tion of the long-term effects of deindustrialisation and the legacy of slavery.
That former slave states are to incarceration what Rust Belt states are to
deindustrialisation is reflected in how eight out of the top ten incarcerator
states in this time period are former slave states.
The baseline model is displayed in Table 6.3, indicating that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in deindustrialisation (mean = 11.2, standard devia-
tion = 3.5) reduces life expectancy for the poor by 0.26 years (95% CI: [0.10,
0.42]; P = 0.002). Relative to the average state, those states characterised by
a job destruction rate in manufacturing of 20% or more lost at least another
0.641 years. In the case of incarceration (mean = 399.7, standard deviation
= 145.1), each standard deviation increase is associated with a loss of 0.68
years (95% CI: [0.31, 1.05]; P < 0.001). Compared to the poor living in the
average state, those living in states characterised by high incarceration (such
as Louisiana, with a mean incarceration rate of 837.0 prisoners per 100,000
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Figure 6.1: Linear trend in the gap in life expectancy between the top and the bottom
income quartiles between 2001 and 2014.
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Figure 6.2: Bivariate association between job destruction rate, lagged one year, and life
expectancy at age 40 in the bottom income quartile, 2001–2014.
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Figure 6.3: Bivariate association between prison incarceration rate, lagged one year, and
life expectancy at age 40 in the bottom income quartile, 2001–2014.
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Figure 6.4: Average life expectancy in the bottom income quartile in the top-five and
bottom-five incarcerator states, 2001–2014.
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Figure 6.5: Life expectancy in the bottom income quartile in Rust Belt states versus other
states, 2001–2014.
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Figure 6.6: Life expectancy in the bottom income quartile in former slave states versus
other states, 2001–2014.
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Table 6.3: Baseline fixed effects model of life expectancy in the bottom income quartile
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Job destruction rate t−1 -0.26 0.08 0.002
Incarceration rate t−1 -0.68 0.19 < 0.001
Notes: The outcome variable is state-level life expectancy at age 40 for those in the bottom
income quartile; the predictors are the annual job destruction rate in the manufacturing
sector and the prison incarceration rate per 100,000 population, both variables lagged one
year; the model only controls for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies (not
displayed); both predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the variable
mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the change
(in years) in life expectancy associated with a one standard deviation increase in each
predictor. N = 697. R2 = 24.4%.
residents) lost more than two years of life expectancy. The model meets all
diagnostic criteria and explains almost a quarter of the state-level variation
in life expectancy amongst the poor, as evidenced by an R2 value equal to
24.4%.
The sensitivity analysis where state-level control variables are added and
removed from the baseline model one by one is visualised in Figure 6.7. First
of all, I run the same baseline model with race-adjusted life expectancy as the
outcome variable. These estimates “remove the differences in life expectancy
across areas and income groups that are due to differences in the racial com-
position of those areas” (Health Inequality Project, 2016). The results prove
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robust to such differences, and also to all other control variables, as evidenced
by how the magnitudes and confidence intervals of deindustrialisation and
incarceration remain largely unchanged across alternative model specifica-
tions. The majority of the controls are statistically insignificant, but a truly
remarkable result is that living in rich states or states undergoing economic
growth does not aid the poor, and may even have a negative effect (βGDP
= -0.37; 95% CI: [-0.65, -0.10]; P = 0.008).1 Otherwise, a high population
fraction of smokers is, as expected, associated with a reduced life expectancy
(β = -0.19; 95% CI: [-0.34, -0.03]; P = 0.02).
As a robustness check, I also bundle different control variables together
into three main categories: behavioural controls, economic controls, and wel-
fare state controls. Results for these models are displayed in Tables 6.4,
6.5, and 6.6. This does not change the substantive findings. Once again,
job destruction and incarceration rates are statistically significant across all
models, whereas most control variables remain insignificant.
When I run similar models with life expectancy in the top income quartile
as the outcome variable, the impacts of deindustrialisation and incarceration
are negligible, as shown in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.8. However, the reader
will note that both GDP per capita and economic growth exert a significant
positive impact (βGDP = 0.50; 95% CI: [0.09, 0.92]; P = 0.02; βgrowth = 0.26;
95% CI: [0.12, 0.40]; P < 0.001). When viewed in tandem with the results for
the bottom income quartile, this reflects the inegalitarian nature of American
1 Perhaps this can be seen as yet another sound of the death knell for McKeown’s
thesis, according to which economic growth is the fundamental force for improving health
and wellbeing (see Szreter, 2005).
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Figure 6.7: Coefficient plot of fixed effects control models; the outcome variable is state-
level life expectancy at age 40 for those in the bottom income quartile; the main predictors
are the annual job destruction rate in the manufacturing sector and the prison incarcer-
ation rate per 100,000 population, both variables lagged one year, adjusted for aggregate
annual time trends using year dummies (not displayed); control variables are added and
removed one by one; the figure shows parameter estimates and corresponding 95% confi-
dence intervals; all predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the variable
mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the change
(in years) in life expectancy associated with a one standard deviation increase in each
predictor. 149
Table 6.4: Fixed effects model with behavioural controls
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Job destruction rate t−1 -0.26 0.08 0.002
Incarceration rate t−1 -0.60 0.20 0.002
Fraction obese 0.03 0.10 0.77
Fraction physically inactive -0.12 0.07 0.10
Fraction smokers -0.17 0.08 0.04
Overdose rate -0.01 0.08 0.94
Homicide rate -0.03 0.12 0.77
Notes: The outcome variable is state-level life expectancy at age 40 for those in the bottom
income quartile; the predictors are the annual job destruction rate in the manufacturing
sector and the prison incarceration rate per 100,000 population, both variables lagged one
year; the model controls for the state population fraction who are obese, physically inactive,
or smokers, the state overdose and homicide rates, as well as for aggregate annual time
trends using year dummies (not displayed); all predictors are standardised by calculating
deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients
are interpreted as the change (in years) in life expectancy associated with a one standard
deviation increase in each predictor. N = 691. R2 = 25.0%.
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Table 6.5: Fixed effects model with economic controls
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Job destruction rate t−1 -0.23 0.08 0.005
Incarceration rate t−1 -0.60 0.20 0.003
GDP per capita -0.41 0.22 0.06
GDP growth -0.004 0.03 0.90
Size of manufacturing -0.37 0.41 0.37
Labour force participation rate 0.05 0.19 0.81
Notes: The outcome variable is state-level life expectancy at age 40 for those in the bottom
income quartile; the predictors are the annual job destruction rate in the manufacturing
sector and the prison incarceration rate per 100,000 population, both variables lagged one
year; the model controls for state GDP per capita, GDP growth, the size of the man-
ufacturing sector, labour force participation rates, as well as for aggregate annual time
trends using year dummies (not displayed); all predictors are standardised by calculating
deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients
are interpreted as the change (in years) in life expectancy associated with a one standard
deviation increase in each predictor. N = 647. R2 = 26.4%.
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Table 6.6: Fixed effects model with welfare state controls
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Job destruction rate t−1 -0.26 0.08 0.001
Incarceration rate t−1 -0.59 0.20 0.003
Social spending 0.16 0.16 0.32
Health spending -0.06 0.10 0.56
Welfare spending 0.13 0.17 0.43
Fraction uninsured 0.00004 0.06 1.00
Notes: The outcome variable is state-level life expectancy at age 40 for those in the bottom
income quartile; the predictors are the annual job destruction rate in the manufacturing
sector and the prison incarceration rate per 100,000 population, both variables lagged one
year; the model controls for state social spending, health spending, and public welfare
spending, the state population fraction with no medical insurance, as well as for aggregate
annual time trends using year dummies (not displayed); all predictors are standardised
by calculating deviations from the variable mean and dividing by one standard deviation;
coefficients are interpreted as the change (in years) in life expectancy associated with a
one standard deviation increase in each predictor. N = 691. R2 = 24.8%.
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Table 6.7: Baseline fixed effects model of life expectancy in the top income quartile
Coefficient Standard error P -value
Job destruction rate t−1 0.07 0.16 0.65
Incarceration rate t−1 -0.27 0.26 0.30
Notes: The outcome variable is state-level life expectancy at age 40 for those in the top
income quartile; the predictors are the annual job destruction rate in the manufacturing
sector and the prison incarceration rate per 100,000 population, both variables lagged one
year; the model only controls for aggregate annual time trends using year dummies (not
displayed); both predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the variable
mean and dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the change
(in years) in life expectancy associated with a one standard deviation increase in each
predictor. N = 697. R2 = 41.7%.
growth, which seems to benefit the wealthy but which does little, if anything,
to relieve the plight of the worst off.
6.4 Discussion
The main findings suggest that, between 2001 and 2014, the loss in life ex-
pectancy for the bottom income quartile associated with deindustrialisation
and incarceration was substantial. To put the results in perspective, the de-
mographic impact of all cancers corresponds to approximately 3.2 years of
reduced life expectancy (Arias et al., 2013). On the basis of the findings in
this chapter, the implied average gain, were incarceration and deindustriali-
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Figure 6.8: Coefficient plot of fixed effects control models; the outcome variable is state-
level life expectancy at age 40 for those in the top income quartile; the main predictors are
the annual job destruction rate in the manufacturing sector and the prison incarceration
rate per 100,000 population, both variables lagged one year, adjusted for aggregate annual
time trends using year dummies (not displayed); control variables are added and removed
one by one; the figure shows parameter estimates and corresponding 95% confidence inter-
vals; all predictors are standardised by calculating deviations from the variable mean and
dividing by one standard deviation; coefficients are interpreted as the change (in years) in
life expectancy associated with a one standard deviation increase in each predictor.
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sation to be entirely eliminated (although an extreme counterfactual), would
be over two and half years. This suggests that the adverse health effects
of rapid socioeconomic dislocation and of the punitive regulation of poverty
could explain virtually the entire increase in the vital gap between the top
and the bottom income quartiles since 2001, which has increased by around
two years (see Figure 6.1).
As noted earlier, it is likely that these phenomena unleash cascading
effects: the weakening of American labour has left large swathes of the popu-
lation in chronic unemployment, vulnerable to economic insecurity, psychoso-
cial stress, and behavioural patterns involving drug abuse, self-harm, or inter-
personal violence (Matthews et al., 2001; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003; Kubrin
et al., 2006; Browning and Heinesen, 2012; McLean, 2016). Moreover, it
is plausible to suggest that smoking, physical inactivity, overweight/obesity,
and other proximal determinants may be viewed as pathways rather than con-
founders of the relationship between deindustrialisation and life expectancy.
However, the health behaviour variables used in the present analysis are ag-
gregated up to the state level from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System surveys and do not provide the empirical basis to explicitly test this
hypothesis.
The political response to this form of social turbulence has been largely
punitive, as was detailed in the Introduction and chapter 2, further perpetu-
ating and amplifying inequalities in life expectancy. A further consideration
is that, in areas with lower life expectancy, individuals may reason that there
is little point in investing in measures that would improve their economic
prospects and may substitute short-term rewards, even if illegal, for uncer-
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tain longer-term benefits, consistent with a substantial body of evidence on
time preferences and health-related behaviour (Griskevicius et al., 2011; Bar-
low et al., 2016). Thus, deindustrialisation, incarceration, and poor health
mutually interact to create a vicious downward cycle.
I acknowledge the limitations of this analysis. The spatiotemporal di-
mensionality of the data imposes restrictions on the statistical power of the
presented models. Significant portions of variance are suppressed in a state-
level analysis, which conceals deeper inequalities and more salient effects
located at the county or city levels, as revealed in the previous chapters. The
time period in question (2001 to 2014) comes well after the onset of massive
industrial decline and the explosion of incarceration that started in the 1970s
– although, as noted in chapter 2, there was a sharp acceleration in employ-
ment decline in manufacturing beginning in 2000. As such, my analysis fails
to capture the full magnitude of the effects of interest.
The data from the Health Inequality Project report lower mortality rates
than those registered by the Social Security Administration. For method-
ological reasons, Chetty and colleagues restrict their sample to individual
residents with positive earnings (any income subject to filed tax returns). As
they point out in their web appendix, the 9% of the population who are thus
excluded from their analysis account for no less than 38% of total deaths.
This means that the average mortality rate in this fraction of the population
is at least four times larger than the mean mortality rate of individuals with
positive earnings. As such, the present analysis does not capture the impacts
of deindustrialisation and incarceration on those who fall below the positive
income threshold. One may surmise that both factors, but incarceration in
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particular, exert a substantial deleterious effect on the life chances of these
individuals. Another limitation is that life expectancy data by income have
only been released at age 40, thereby excluding deaths at younger ages, for
example from drugs and violence, that may be especially important in this
population, as was indicated in the earlier analysis of premature mortality
risk. Indeed, spatial variation in overall life expectancy at birth – as was used
in the previous chapter – is far greater than (state-level) variation in income-
disaggregated life expectancy at age 40. In short, the health consequences of
industrial decline and punitive social policy are likely underestimated with
currently available data.
6.5 Conclusion
Between 2001 and 2014, deindustrialisation and incarceration constituted im-
portant determinants of life expectancy for the poor but not for the wealthy,
generating deeply consequential health deficits for states adopting punitive
responses to economic stagnation. The historical legacies of rapid industrial
decline and slavery are likely to exert substantial long-term effects on vital
inequality. Therefore, for a full understanding of health inequalities in the
United States, researchers must remain conscious of the upstream political
and economic determinants of public health. If public policy responses to
growing health inequalities are to be effective, they must consider industrial
policy as well as ending (hyper)incarceration of society’s most vulnerable.
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Conclusion
The libidinal achievements demanded of an individual behav-
ing as healthy in body and mind, are such as can be performed
only at the cost of the profoundest mutilation [. . . ]. Just as the
old injustice is not changed by the lavish display of light, air and
hygiene, but is in fact concealed by the gleaming transparency of
rationalized big business, the inner health of our time has been
secured by blocking flight into illness without in the slightest al-
tering its aetiology. [. . . ] The very people who burst with proofs of
exuberant vitality could easily be taken for prepared corpses, from
whom the news of their not-quite-successful decease has been with-
held for reasons of population policy. Underlying the prevalent
health is death.
Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia
“All that is solid melts into air”, Marx and Engels famously said. Capital-
ism’s “creative destruction” once left over half a million handloom weavers
to die a lingering death “when industry no longer had any need for them”
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(Hobsbawm, 1996: 37). Today, the industrial proletariat, two centuries af-
ter it was “introduced to its role not so much by attraction [. . . ] but by
compulsion, force and fear” (Pollard, 1965: 207), is crumbling under the
weight of economic restructuring. Much like its birth, it seems to be dy-
ing in agony, and in so doing, to quote Marx once more, is experiencing
“the loss of [the] old world with no gain of a new one” (cited in Hobsbawm,
1995: 162). It is therefore important to preempt any “creeping industrial
nostalgia” (Cowie and Heathcott, 2003: 14) when discussing the political
economy of America’s public health landscape (see Milkman, 1997). Indeed,
industrialisation and deindustrialisation are “merely two ongoing aspects of
the history of capitalism that describe continual and complicated patterns
of investment and disinvestment” (Cowie and Heathcott, 2003: 15). The
story of (de)industrisalisation is thus not “a simple, unidirectional story of
political and economic stability followed by decline” but one that is “pock-
marked with explosions, relocations, desertions, and competitive struggles”
(ibid : 14). The same goes for the disciplinary treatment of poverty, which,
despite the incomparable expansion of the penal apparatus in recent decades,
has a rich historical foundation (Piven and Cloward, 1993; Geremek, 1994).
This is why, throughout the thesis, I have tended to employ the word “cap-
italism” rather than the more in-vogue notion of “neoliberalism”. Although
the temporal window of my analysis has largely been confined to the 1980s
onwards, an implicit argument of mine is quite simply that the historical
roots of the contemporary patterning of life chances go back much further
than a sole focus on neoliberalism would indicate. Although the distinct in-
stitutional features of neoliberalism have been studied extensively and their
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deleterious effects on health have been documented (e.g. Labonté and Stuck-
ler, 2016; see Beckfield and Krieger, 2009), its frequent usage easily morphs
into a discursive bulwark against a critical (re)conceptualisation of capitalism
itself.2
My substantive argument has been that the currently prevalent mode of
poverty regulation in the wake of economic decline is characterised by how
political emphasis is consistently shifted from the protective to the corrective
wing of the policy apparatus. Social assistance for the victims of “creative
destruction” is subject to increasingly stringent conditions, chief amongst
them the forced participation in precarious wage work in segmented labour
markets (see Kalleberg, 2011). At the bottom of the class structure, Amer-
ican capitalism thus seems to have reinstituted in naked form what Weber
identified as one of its integral components, namely “free labour” whereby
workers, “under the compulsion of the whip of hunger” (Weber, 2013: 277),
sell their labour power. The gaping wounds inflicted by economic disruption
are sutured with disciplinary policy instruments that either enforce degrad-
ing work parameters or invisibilise those who are caught in the interstices
through penal confinement and sociopolitical ostracisation. Taken together,
deindustrialisation and incarceration have fractured the working class and
contributed to the rise of a precarious (sub)proletariat in which health dis-
advantages are disproportionately concentrated. The result is a nascent “pre-
2 Of the word “capitalism”, Fernand Braudel notes that “after a long struggle, I gave
up trying to get rid of this troublesome intruder. I decided in the end that there was
nothing to be gained by throwing out along with the word the controversies it arouses.
[. . . ] In any case, such precautions are delusive: if capitalism is thrown out of the door, it
comes in through the window” (Braudel, 1983: 231).
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cariat” suffering from joint social and biological “sub-citizenship” (Sparke,
2017).
I have sought to substantiate this line of argument in two principal steps.
First, I have sketched the historical backdrop against which American social
policy has undergone a distinctively punitive transformation. On the one
hand, I have argued that the political economy of industrial decline, and the
concentration of corporate power that subtends it, fed into deepening vul-
nerability at the bottom of the class structure. Most notably, the nexus of
class and ethno-racial division heralded a prolonged period of intense polit-
ical turbulence in the wake of rapid economic change. On the other hand,
this very development opened the space for a punitive rather than protective
policy response from above, driven by an ideological mechanism by which the
fundamentally political issue of deepening inequality was recast as a problem
of “law and order” – i.e. one that required the iron fist of the penal state
rather than the maternal hand of the welfare apparatus. Buttressed by me-
dia sensationalisation and consolidated by a large-scale electoral realignment
amongst Democrats and Republicans alike, this punitive turn discarded any
mainstream political commitment to public investments in housing, (mental)
health care, employment security, or the “root causes” of crime and violence.
Instead, it reoriented welfare towards workfare and initiated a historically
unprecedented expansion of the criminal justice system.
Second, I have presented a series of empirical analyses drawing on hith-
erto unavailable data at the county level between 1980 and 2014. Using a
number of methodological approaches, I have demonstrated an empirically ro-
bust association between high rates of incarceration and disparities in health
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and wellbeing. I commenced with the analysis of mortality rates from drug
use disorders, which have grown exponentially in recent times, taking tens
of thousands of lives every year. Both fixed effects, random effects, and
“between”-county models showed that jail and prison admissions rates may
constitute important predictors of America’s ongoing public health crisis.
Similarly robust associations were demonstrated with broader measures of
vital inequality, namely age-standardised all-cause mortality rates, prema-
ture mortality rates, and life expectancy at birth.
The limitations of the present study have been listed earlier but are worth
revisiting as a means of delineating avenues for future research. First, my
principal focus has been on incarceration, but, as emphasised throughout, in-
carceration is but one component of a much broader policy repertoire. There
is a need to unpack the socially differentiated operations of the policy appa-
ratus, which, as noted in chapter 2, mobilises different “hands” of the state
in divergent ways across different social strata, from condemning deprived
households to homelessness through eviction to ensuring generous welfare
provisions for the wealthy through large-scale public expenditures. Future
research in the political economy of public health should seek to probe the
causes and consequences of that distinct form of institutional imbrication
that results in retributive interventionism at the bottom and avuncular pro-
tectionism at the top of the social structure.
Second, although I have posited the existence of a causal chain leading
from the macroeconomic to the molecular, I have not been able to empirically
disaggregate the relevant pathways. This is primarily a data problem, but
also involves theorising the relevant “fundamental” causal relationships (Link
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and Phelan, 1995). A more complete analysis would involve fleshing out the
mediators leading from political and economic factors such as industrial de-
cline to population health outcomes, but also to investigate treatment effect
heterogeneity across social and physical space. Chapter 6 showed that in-
dustrial decline and incarceration affect the lifespans of the poor but not the
rich. However, there are other forms of heterogeneity that warrant deeper ex-
amination, including interactive spillover effects across a range of individual-
level and local attributes, notably at the interface of the three main types
of inequality. For instance, how does hyperincarceration in one community
affect a neighbouring community? (How) does “despair” spread through so-
cial networks? How does resource deprivation “spill over” onto symbolically
mediated gradations of honour and status (say, ethno-racial domination),
and vice versa? Or how does the gendered nature of punitive social policy,
whereby men go to prison and women are thrust into precarious wage work
or evicted, relate to the fact that women systematically outlive men, espe-
cially at the lower end of the socioeconomic order? Answering such questions
entails not only access to better data but also a deeper engagement with the
theory of causality – one which identifies (in the statistical sense) operant
mechanisms but also accommodates feedback loops and recursive relations
(such as the ones between racialised poverty, incarceration, and health).
Third, the principal unit of analysis in this thesis, the county, has not
been problematised in a systematic way. The main justification for using the
county measure has been that, contrary to common belief, it constitutes the
principal unit of the American penal state. Even those who are sentenced
to long prison sentences at the state level are, in the vast majority of cases,
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passed through local jails in pre-trial detention. However, there is a signif-
icant amount of variation in how county authorities operate their jails and
how the local penal apparatus relates both to state-level institutions and
to local populations. An effort has been made in the preceding analyses to
prune the data set in ways that facilitate easy comparability across counties,
yet future research should further probe the kinds of regional differences at
work and relate them to the lived experiences of local populations. This
warrants the use of disaggregated data that can assess the criss-crossing of
individual-level and ecological forces within a truly multilevel framework.
Fourth, in the vein of Case and Deaton, the thesis has placed partic-
ular emphasis on the “demand-side” factors that have driven the overdose
epidemic – factors like (political responses to) socioeconomic insecurity. How-
ever, a major focus in the extant literature is on “supply-side” factors, most
notably the role of pharmaceutical corporations like Purdue, who manufac-
ture and aggressively advertise opioids like OxyContin through a variety of
channels, including via physicians. In chapter 4, I sought to account for this
aspect by matching counties on local opioid prescription rates. However, this
is unlikely to do justice to the causal complexity at work, nor does it take into
account other dimensions of local drug environments, such as the availability
of illicit drugs like cocaine or heroin, which play an important substitute
role once addiction has been created. Broader vital inequality (in all-cause
mortality or life expectancy) is also shaped by the availability of (un)healthy
food and drink, tobacco and alcohol, or physical exercise facilities – all of
which have their own corporate determinants. In short, future work on this
topic must better investigate the interplay between “supply” and “demand”
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factors.
Fifth, the present study has failed to assess the temporal structure by
which macro-level factors shape vital inequality. In epidemiological parlance,
the “aetiological period” has not been adequately addressed. Moreover, there
may be causal heterogeneity across time periods. My models adjust for ag-
gregate time trends using a maximally flexible year term, namely year dum-
mies, which helps reduce model dependence related to temporal heterogeneity
but suppresses temporally mediated differences that may be of substantive
interest, including for instance changes in demographic compositions and
(im)migration patterns. However, there is heterogeneity not only across time
but also across space in ways that do not necessarily match onto one another,
rendering the choice of cut-off points and county-year groupings somewhat
arbitrary. I have therefore refrained from further time-stratification, which is
at least partly predicated on a precise knowledge of the aetiological windows
at work, including long-run effects. Future research should seek to integrate
an understanding of timing that goes beyond the addition of “lags” in sta-
tistical models (Beckfield, 2018) or simply “adjusting” away a quantity of
substantive interest, namely time and its autocorrelating effects on observed
data (see King, 1998: 163). As with each of the aforementioned points, such
a task is obviously predicated on the existence and availability of high-quality
and relevant empirical materials, ideally in the form of micro-level adminis-
trative records that capture an entire population over time (see e.g. Chetty
et al., 2018), coupled with the integration of biomedical data.
Sixth, I have made the case that vital inequality in the United States is
anchored in a set of social dynamics that operate across purely ethno-racial
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boundaries. Nevertheless, a limitation of my analysis has been a lack of
deeper engagement with the nexus of class and race at the empirical level.
My models control of the ethno-racial composition of counties, as well as
for the median household income, but ultimately fail to move beyond the
deployment of seemingly isolated (and imperfectly measured) “variables” in
analysing the political economy of inequality. This limitation is not reducible
to that of “quantitative” methods per se, as evidenced by how the use of
administrative records has proven fruitful in quantifying some of the relevant
dynamics at work (see e.g. Chetty et al, 2018). Nonetheless, an ethnographic
approach may very well have shed fresh light on this matter in a way that
eludes even the most refined statistical model.
Seventh, where the present study has been entirely focused on the United
States, a comparative political economy of public health may breathe fresh
understanding into this nascent field of research. A break with “methodolog-
ical nationalism” would involve the study of how different configurations of
power exert diverse health impacts across “varieties of capitalism” (Hall and
Soskice, 2001) over time and space. However, as evidenced by the history of
deindustrialisation, the political economy of capitalism is also the political
economy of global capitalism, involving the world polity as a locus of political
struggle between unequally equipped actors (Beckfield, 2003; 2010). As such,
a promising avenue for future research is the study of how a distinct policy
paradigm has not only spread across the Atlantic to Europe (see Nosrati
and Marmot, 2019) but has also been imposed on low- and middle-income
countries at the behest of powerful international financial organisations like
the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank (Kentikelenis, 2017).
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The imposition of structural adjustment – typically entailing a set of man-
dated economic reforms targeting fiscal austerity and market “deregulation”3
– typifies one form of coercive norm enforcement of which the ultimate man-
ifestation is armed intervention. The latter is a remarkably underdeveloped
area of research, i.e. the study of military power as a determinant of public
health (cf. Murray et al., 2002). In this context, the United States con-
stitutes a valid starting point of enquiry – being, as it is, a country whose
unparalleled military zest reached its latest climax under the presidential
aegis of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.
Finally, there is a need to complement the study of “unequalisation”
with that of “equalisation”, as seen through a macroscopic lens. This in-
volves investigating structural forces and identifying concrete mechanisms
by which (in)equality is reworked or recalibrated. Although the principal
tools of equalisation in an unequal world may be known (Therborn, 2013:
64, Table 5), their operationalisation, at least on a global scale, is inchoate
at best. Equalisation implies not only the development of roadmaps to pol-
icy interventions, which poses challenges in its own right (Reeves, 2017). It
also implies a fundamental reworking of the very parameters of our collec-
tive imagination. At a time when, against the backdrop of imminent climate
breakdown, the most widely espoused solution to all the world’s problems is
continued economic growth, it is becoming increasingly hard to envision a
qualitatively different yet politically potent modus operandi. This is a symp-
tom of how, as it were, “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than
3 A more accurate term is “re-regulation” (in favour of corporations).
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the end of capitalism”.4 Moreover, insofar as equalisation is the obverse of
unequalisation – an effort to heal an already inflicted wound or to console
the already traumatised – a commitment to equality is perhaps even better
served by addressing the underlying aetiology of our collective predicament.
Perhaps, then, the first step towards veritable equality is a reinvented fidelity
to the principle of justice.
4 Attributed to both Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek. See Fisher (2009).
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